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Summary: This is an empirical paper seeking to identify the mode of Turkey’s integration into global 
markets in general and pan-European markets in particular as revealed in its trade performance. The 
analysis provides empirical support to the following observations. First, thanks to steady expansion of trade 
in goods and services since the mid-1980s, Turkey has become highly integrated into the world economy. 
Second, Turkey’s export performance in 1996-2004 in EU markets bears strong similarities to the 
aggregate performance of new EU members from Central Europe (EU-8). Similarities include dynamics, 
similar factors responsible for the increased presence in EU markets, factor content and the role of 
‘producer-driven’ network trade.  
Turkey, together with Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Poland, 
stands as one of the top performers in ‘producer-driven’ network trade indicating participation in a new 
global division of labor based on production fragmentation. 
The available evidence suggests an economic success story in the making. Export expansion owes 
a lot to improved policy environment and domestic liberalization. It is rather telling that the recent 
expansion has coincided with the implementation of most of the provisions of EU-Turkey CU Agreement, 
the completion of the removal of tariffs on trade in industrial products among the pan-European parties to 
the Pan European Agreement Cumulation of the Rules of Origin and improved macroeconomic stability 
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The experience of countries that have successfully taken advantage of opportunities 
offered by global markets suggests that at least three critical elements have to be in place: 
macroeconomic stability, contestable and competitive domestic markets that are open to external 
competition and well-functioning backbone services. Macroeconomic instabilities destroy 
business activity. Contestable and competitive markets provide firms with access to cheap inputs 
and capital equipment that are well endowed in research and development, and force inefficient 
firms out of business. Backbone services (telecommunications, banking, insurance, 
transportation, business services, etc.) together with customs, related border clearance regulatory 
procedures, technical standards regulations and ports’ efficiency shape the ease and speed with 
which goods and services move across national borders and, therefore, are crucial to trade in 
goods. 
Historically, Turkey fails the macroeconomic test, as it has been “on a roller coaster of 
booms and busts for decades” (Barysch 2005), with the last crisis taking place in 2001. GDP fell 
7 percent and inflation soared to 70 percent. Macroeconomic stability appears now to be under 
control, with inflation in the single-digit range and GDP strongly growing. As for the remaining 
two ingredients, the Customs Union Agreement with the EU has contributed immensely to the 
emergence of contestable domestic markets and the combination of measures supported by 
multilateral financial institutions has contributed to improved efficiency in services sectors 
(Hoekman and Subidey 2005).  
Since all these measures are of relatively recent vintage, one would expect Turkey’s 
performance to be poor in terms of its capacity to take advantage of opportunities offered, in 
particular, by policy-induced integration into the EU and pan-European markets for industrial 
products. But, contrary to expectations, this paper, which analyzes Turkey’s dynamics and 
patterns of integration into global markets, provides empirical evidence that this has not been the 
case. While indeed imports fluctuated following the time pattern of GDP boosts and busts, 
exports have remained largely impervious to macroeconomic crises for the last two decades. 
Despite occasional slow-downs, they have largely kept pace with the growth of world exports. 
More surprisingly, however, they have impressively expanded since around 2000-01.Turkey’s 
share in world exports rose 60 percent from 0.4 percent in 2000 to 0.7 percent in 2004. Turkey’s 
share in EU external imports increased by the same amount. Only Romania, one of the top export 
performers among Pan-European economies during that period, matched Turkey’s export 
performance in both EU and world markets. The share of EU-8 in world exports rose 30 percent 
in 2000-04, that is, less than the respective shares of Turkey and Romania. 
While the recent export expansion has been both surprising and impressive, its drivers 
and consequently ensuing mode of integration into global markets are even more astonishing. 
Turkey’s export basket, although still dominated by unskilled labor intensive products, has been 
moving quickly towards products characterized by a higher level of processing, medium to high 
technology content and the use of skilled labor. The major force, albeit not the only one, behind 
this shift has been the entry of Turkish-based firms into ‘producer-driven’ networks—automotive 
and information communication technology networks, which are capital- and skilled-labor-
intensive industries. In consequence, a number of Turkish firms have become part of a new 
division of labor based on production fragmentation made possible by the combination of 
information technology and economic liberalization.  
Turkey is the only country among EU candidates whose firms appear to participate in 
division of labor driven by production fragmentation and their scope of involvement is more 
extensive than that of firms from some new EU members (EU-8). Together with six EU-8 
economies (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Poland),   3
Turkey—with the share of ‘producer-driven’ networks in exports of manufactures, excluding 
chemicals, exceeding 20 percent in 2003 and double-digit growth rates—has been dubbed in a 
recent World Bank study (WB 2005) as one of the seven “High Performers” among European and 
Central Asian countries. Turkey’s share of 22.5 percent puts it on a par with Slovenia in 
‘producer-driven’ network trade.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section discusses 
implications of the “Turkish-EU connection” for contestability of domestic markets and 
conditions faced by Turkish firms in access to foreign markets. Section 3 examines geographical 
patterns and dynamics of Turkey’s trade in goods and services in the context of EU-8 and other 
EU candidate economies. Section 4 seeks to examine changes in the degree of processing, 
technology content and factor intensities of Turkish trade with a special emphasis on trade with 
the EU and other countries from the Pan-European free trade area for industrial products. Section 
5 examines trade in ‘buyer-driven’ chains, (textiles and clothing, footwear and furniture) and the 
shift towards ‘producer-driven’ networks (automotive and Information Communication 
Technology networks). The last Section concludes.  
2.  Contestability of domestic markets and access to external markets 
The pillar defining Turkey’s trade policy is preferential relationship, or more precisely 
the CU (Customs Union) Agreement with the European Union, with enormous implications for 
both conditions in access of domestic producers to external markets as well as contestability of 
domestic markets, that is, the extent to which local firms are exposed to competition from 
imports. The CU Agreement, which went into force on 1 January 1996, has already resulted in 
Turkey’s adoption of the Community's Common Customs Tariff (CCT) for imports of industrial 
products from the third countries. Turkey has also taken up the EU rules of origin and EU 
customs procedures (customs valuations, customs declaration, release for free circulation and 
duty-suspension arrangements). The Agreement has also triggered reforms of technical standards 
regime and competition policy infrastructure. 
The CU Agreement has contributed to a very significant increase in contestability of 
domestic Turkish markets through infusing predictability, transparency and stability to trade 
policy as well as by liberalizing market access, i.e., lowering or removal of both tariff and non-
tariff barrier, for both preferential and MFN suppliers. The extent of liberalization of tariff rates 
has been very extensive. Consider that MFN applied tariff rates on tradable goods with non-
preferential partners had to be reduced from an average of 22 percent in 1994 to 6.9 percent in 
2001, GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) beneficiaries from 22 percent to 2.7 percent, and 
with the EU’s FTA (Free Trade Agreements) partners from 22 percent to 1.34 percent and with 
the EU from 10.2 percent to 1.34 percent (Togan 1997 and 2000).  
Turkey’s applied MFN tariff rates for industrial products, the same as those of the EU, 
represent one of the lowest, if not the lowest, levels of MFN tariff protection among economies at 
a similar level of economic development. Turkey’s both weighted and simple average tariff rates 
on industrial imports are several times lower than those in other candidate countries.  
Tariff rates are not only low but they are also predictable and stable. Since they are tied to 
EU tariffs as well as comprehensive EU commitments under the WTO agreements, they are 
resistant to domestic pressures for tariff protection. 
As far as non-tariff barriers are concerned, technical barriers to trade have significantly 
declined with Turkey’s gradual transition to the EU technical standards regime. Turkey has made 
large strides to establish a modern, market based regime of technical regulations and standards. 
The adoption of international and European standards as well as procedures for admitting goods 
into Turkey not only increase contestability of domestic markets but also create conditions for   4
improved competitiveness of domestic firms in foreign markets. 
The CU Agreement and participation in EU trade initiatives has dramatically improved 
access for Turkish firms not to EU or EFTA markets but also to markets of countries participating 
in EU Eastern Enlargement project. Turkish producers of industrial goods have had duty-free 
access to EU markets since 1971, albeit with some exceptions that were removed by 1999. 
Turkey has already had a FTA with EFTA signed on December 10, 1991, which opened EFTA 
markets to Turkish industrial exports.  
Major new benefits have come from the EU-driven initiative, directly related to EU 
Eastern Enlargement, to establish Pan-European free trade area for industrial products linked 
through a system of diagonal cumulation (WTO 1997). The objective of the Pan-European 
Agreement on Cumulation of the Rules of Origin, which went into effect on January 1, 1997, was 
to encourage Europe-wide industrial cooperation by diagonal cumulation that would allow 
treating imports from parties of the agreement as local inputs. The Pan European Cumulation of 
Origin (PCO) system has encouraged intra industry trade, exports and FDI inflows.
1  The 
Agreement has paved the way for establishment in 2002 of a single European trading bloc for 
industrial products, encompassing the EU-15, EFTA, and ten Central European countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia). As a party to the Agreement, Turkey signed FTAs with Central European countries in 
1997-1999 that eliminated all duties on industrial products by 1 January 2002. This new 
arrangement allowing unfettered distribution of production capacities in the territory of each 
signatory of the Pan-European Agreement, without worrying about meeting the rules of origin 
requirements, has created a very attractive environment for trade. 
As a result of these developments, Turkish producers of industrial goods have become 
exposed to competition from imports and operate in one of the largest, if not the largest, free trade 
areas in the world. Turkish producers of industrial goods are now protected, in terms of tariffs, 
from external competition to exactly the same extent as the EU producers are. Moreover, they are 
not protected by tariffs and have to face competition from duty-free imports of industrial goods 
from world-class Pan-European firms. In return, industrial producers have duty-free market 
access, unrestrained by the rules of origins and tariffs, to the European Economic Area (EU-25 
and EFTA) and two candidate countries—Bulgaria and Romania. The latter two are 
geographically close to Turkey. Together with the “Stabilization and Association” partners of the 
EU from the Balkans (Turkey has either signed or negotiates FTAs), they hold promise to become 
significant markets for Turkish products in the future. Last but not least, consumers and industrial 
users of imports have access to cheaper industrial products. 
3.  Highlights of Turkey’s trade performance: dynamics and geographical 
reorientation 
The dramatic change over the last decade in trading environment within which Turkish 
consumers and producers operate raises questions about how they have adapted to it. What have 
been the major characteristics of Turkey’s overall trade performance? How does it compare to 
other EU-candidates and EU-8 economies? What are its idiosyncratic features, if any? These are 
the main questions addressed in this section.  
                                                           
1 EU preferential rules of origin define the requirements for the local content of raw materials, components 
and value added, including the minimum level of transformation necessary for a product to qualify as 
originating and thus benefiting from preferential treatment in access to the EU market. Since 1997, a 
system of European cumulation, based on a network of free trade agreements and protocols, has been 
established among the EU, the EFTA countries, the Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey. 
Since 2002, the system was extended to the Southern Mediterranean countries as signatories of Association 
Agreements with the EU.    5
A. Trade in goods and services 
Five general features of Turkey’s long term trade performance since 1985 stand out. 
First, except for contraction in 1999, the value of total exports of goods and services has been 
steadily expanding at the average rate of growth (least square estimate) of 10 percent over 1986-
2004. 
Second, imports were highly volatile over 1986-2004 and strongly correlated with GDP 
growth indicating that exchange rate crises and sharply falling incomes in 1994, 1999 and 2001 
have been responsible for contraction in imports (Figure 1). Bursts or implosions in GDP growth 
rates in nominal terms accompanied similar changes in imports. The coefficient of correlation of 
annual changes in imports of goods and services and GDP growth rates in 1985-2003 was 88 
percent. The same coefficient for exports of goods and services and GDP was 35 percent. 
Figure 1: Annual rates of growth in value of exports, imports and GDP in 1990-2004 (in percent) 
Source: Derived from the World Bank’s Development Indicators database. 
Third, Turkey’s integration and dependence on global markets for goods and service has 
significantly increased over the last decade. Exports of goods and services as percent of GDP 
(both in current prices) almost doubled from an average of 16 percent in 1985-90 to 30 percent in 
2000-2004. Trade in goods and services in terms of the GDP strongly expanded in the 1990s. The 
corresponding ratio of 60 percent were more than twice as high in 2000-03 as they were in 1990-
93 (27 percent) indicating rapid increase in reliance of Turkey’s economy on external trade in 
goods and services.  
The level of achieved integration into global markets for goods and services is relatively 
high by regional standards. Although respective values of two indicators expressed in terms of 
GDP—trade and exports of goods and services—are lower than for EU-8, other EU candidates 
and South East European (SEE) economies, the differences are not significant. They stem from 
the size of economy, tourist attractiveness and the level of GDP. Both SEE-4 and EU-8 
economies are much smaller, except Poland, and some of them, on top of being much smaller, 
have also much higher GDP per capita. Both contribute to higher values of openness indicators. 
Taking into account the size of the economy, Turkey compares favorably with the largest 
economy among comparators—Poland. Exports of goods and services in percent of GDP are 






























Imports of goods and services GDP Exports of goods and services  6
Table 1: Turkey’s trade in goods and services as percent of GDP in regional perspective in 
1991-98 and 1999-2004 (in percent) 
       Trade in G&S as % of GDP     Exports of G&S as % of GDP 
Country/Group  1991-98 1999-04 1991-98 1999-04 
Turkey    42.2    57.4  19.2  27.5 
Bulgaria    95.0  114.3  47.4  53.3 
Croatia  105.0    99.5  49.4  46.1 
Romania    56.3    72.3  25.1  33.1 
Memorandum:      
SEE-4 (simple average)    75.4    76.6  24.2  27.0 
EU-8 (simple average) 103.6  119.0 50.7  56.9 
of which: Poland    49.2    55.4  24.2  25.2 
SEE-4 includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro; EU-8 Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Source: Computations are based on World Bank WDI data base through SIMA and Turkey’s Balance of 
Payments statistics for 1999-2003. 
Fourth, in 1985-2004 Turkey’s trade in goods and services has been persistently in the 
red except for three years—1988, 1994 and 2001 due to deficits in trade in goods. Revenues from 
exports of goods and services amounted on average to 89 percent of expenditures on imported 
goods and services in 1990-97 and 92 percent in 1998-2004 (Table 2). The surplus in 2001 affects 
the average for the last period—excluding 2001 the ratio would be 87 percent. This has been 
exclusively due to services, which have been a very large net foreign currency earner, with the 
surplus reaching US$ 13.5 billion in the peak year of 1998 and 12.8 billion in 2004. Surpluses in 
trade in services have significantly offset chronic deficits in trade of goods. Over 1998-2004, 
cumulative surpluses in services amounted to 92 percent of cumulative balances in trade in goods. 
Surplus in services covered 62 percent of a shortfall in goods trade in 2004.  
Table 2: Developments in trade in goods and services in selected years (in billion of US dollars 
and percent) 
     Least  Square  Growth  (%) 
  1991 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1991-98  1999-04  1985-04
      (in $ billion)   
Exports of goods  13.7  32.1  32.1  30.7 28.8 30.7 34.4 40.1 51.2 66.9 14.1  16.8  10.2
Exports of services  8.4  13.4  19.9  23.9 16.9 20.4 16.1 14.8 19.1 24.0 14.4  4.2  10.3
Imports of goods  20.9  42.3  47.2  44.7 39.0 52.7 38.1 47.4 65.2 90.7 12.4  14.5  9.9
Imports of services  3.2  6.8  9.0  10.4 9.4 9.1 6.9 6.9 8.6 11.3 17.4  2.1  11.1
     (in percent)          Average Share 
Service exports in 
total trade 
72 66 69 70 64 69 70 68 69 68 71  68  70
Services in total 
exports 
38 30 38 44 37 40 32 27 27 26 36  30  32
Service exports in 
% of imports 
260 198 221 230 180 225 232 214 222 213 252  214  238
Total exports in % 
of imports 
91 93 93 99 94 83 112 101 95 89 108  105  107
Source: Based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics through World Bank WDI database. 
Fifth, notwithstanding the continuing importance of exports of services as a source of 
foreign currency earnings, the loss of momentum in their growth in 1998-2004 is rather 
bewildering. While the value of their exports increased more than eight times between 1985 and 
1998 and in terms of GDP doubled, exports of services stagnated in 1998-2004. Their share in 
total exports fell from 44 percent in 1998 to around 27 percent in 2002-04 (Table 2). This was in 
large part due to a very strong, double-digit growth of exports of goods.  
To sum up, the level of integration of Turkey into global economy has significantly 
expanded over the last two decades. It is high both in terms of trade in goods and services as well   7
as Turkey has been spending significantly more on imported goods and services than it has been 
receiving in revenues from their exports exclusively due to chronic deficits in trade of goods. In 
contrast to imports, exports have steadily grown since 1986 except for the contraction in 1999. 
They have grown faster than the GDP, with their share doubling between 1986 and 2003. 
Fluctuations of imports seemed to coincide with balance of payments crises and fluctuations in 
GDP growth rates. Despite recent stagnation in their trade, services continue accounting for a 
significant portion of total trade. The share of 29 percent in Turkey’s exports is roughly the same 
as in Bulgaria (30 percent), larger than in Romanian exports (15 percent), and much smaller than 
in export receipts of Croatia (58 percent). 
B. Trade in services: puzzling developments in 1998-2004 
Developments in Turkish trade in services in 1998-2004 display bewildering features. 
Although in line with global trends observed over the last two decades trade in services was 
growing on average at a double-digit growth rate in 1985-98,
2 the expansion came to a screeching 
halt in 1999-2004. During this period, trade in commercial services (excluding government 
services) was unusually volatile, characterized by huge swings, with exports and imports moving 
in tandem. Furthermore, there was a significant change in the composition of this trade and, 
except for revenue from tourism, export performance was poor. 
Total trade turnover in services was falling each year except in 2000 in 1999-2002. It 
took off in 2002-03 growing on average 24.2 percent. In spite of two years of double-digit growth 
rates in 2003 and 2004, the value of services trade turnover was in 2004 only 2 percent higher 
than in 1998. Both exports and imports were responsible for this performance. Imports fell each 
year in 1999-2002 and displayed strong growth in 2003-04. Exports were volatile, although 
beginning in 2000; they displayed similar dynamics as their imports (Table 3 and Figure 2). 
But a recent rebound in both exports and imports of commercial services does not put the 
issue of the 1998-2002 troughs to the dustbin of history. Leaving aside the fact that the data are in 
current dollar values, trade turnover in services others than travel and transport dramatically 
declined over 1998-2004. In 2004, its value was at 9 percent of its peak level in 1998 and 23 
percent of the level in 2000, despite doubling in 2004 over 2003. In terms of GDP, trade in 
services amounted on average to 12 percent in 2002-04 down from the average of 15 percent in 
1998-2001. 
While both receipts from sale of services and expenditures displayed striking volatility 
over 1998-2004, exports in terms of imports—except in 1999—have remained remarkably stable 
over this period, despite the falling surpluses in services balance excluding transport and travel. 
Exports of these other services in terms of their imports fell from to 234 percent in 1998 to 135 
percent in 2004 (see Table 3).  
                                                           
2 The share of commercial services in world exports of goods and services increased from 15 percent to 20 
percent over the last two decades. See Maurer and Chauvet 2002.    8
Table 3: Exports and imports of commercial services with and without transport and travel 
services in 1998-2004 (in million of US dollars) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Exports of commercial services  23,526 16,590 20,112 15,884 14,722  18,928  23,788
Imports of commercial services  9,761 8,813 8,467 6,435 6,271  7,708  10,280
Exports in % of imports  241 188 238 247 235  246  231
Exports excluding travel and transportation  13,229 8,487 9,521 4,940 3,448  3,541  4,633
Imports excluding travel and transportation  5,642 5,241 4,291 2,676 2,457  2,888  3,425
Exports in % of imports  234 162 222 185 140  123  135
Source: Balance of payments statistics. 
Figure 2: Change in exports and imports of commercial services (1998=100) 
Source: Balance of payments statistics. 
Because of the strong performance of tourism, the decline in trade turnover of other 
services and the collapse in exports of other commercial services (excluding travel and transport) 
had no impact on the ratio of exports to imports of commercial services. Annual changes in the 
value of exports varied in the range between –29 percent and +29 percent and in the value of 
imports between –24 percent and +33 percent. Moreover, they coincided in time—the value of 
the correlation coefficient for annual changes in 1999-2004 is high at 81 percent. In consequence, 
exports in terms of imports remained stable—the average ratio for the 1998-2004 period was 
2.32, with a low value of the coefficient of variation of 0.09 and standard deviation of 0.20. 
While undoubtedly earthquakes, war in Iraq and perceptions of instabilities in the Middle 
East might have suppressed tourism in the region, tourism (travel services) recorded hefty growth 
in current US dollars of 15.5 percent per year in 1998-2004. It was the only item that did not 
experience contraction in exports in terms of value over this period. But its performance was not 
sufficiently robust to offset the decline in other exports, as total receipts had a negative growth 
rate in 1998-2004. Among other categories of services, the strongest performer was transport, 
with the average annual, negative growth rate of (-) 1.5 percent in 1998-2004. 
Stagnation in exports of services over 1999-2004 was the result of the collapse of receipts 
from sales of all services sectors identified in balance of payments statistics except for tourism 
and transport (Table 4). The aggregate receipts from other sectors stood in 2004 at 55 percent of 
their level in 1999 and 35 percent of their level in 1998. The inclusion of transport does not 
significantly alter the overall picture—revenues in 2004 were 37 percent below their 1999 level 






















Table 4: Composition of exports of services and their exports in terms of imports in 1998-2004 
  Memorandum: change in value 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Index, 2002  Index, 2004 
.  Receipts from services exports    2000=100  1999=100 
Transport 15% 18% 19% 12% 14%   95  113 
Travel 38% 51% 58% 70% 67% 111  305 
Construction 5% 4% 6% 4% 3%   86  66 
Other commercial services  28% 18% 7% 7% 7%  18  36 
Insurance and financial services  2% 2% 2% 2% 1%  60  90 
Other services  13% 7% 9% 6% 9%  53  77 
  Exports in terms of imports     
Transport services  120 141 145 81 75  79  206 
Travel services  446 465 451 625 629 110  172 
Other commercial services  376 246 94 98 109  73  137 
Insurance and financial services  55 46 36 78 76  93  60 
Other services  123 139 183 107 128  35  45 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments statistics. 
And a cursory examination of trade developments in various categories of services does 
not alter the picture. In fact, it raises a lot of new questions but offers few, if any, answers, with 
developments in some instances defying common wisdom. For instance, considering revealed 
comparative advantage of Turkish construction companies, supported among others by press 
information about construction bids won abroad (e.g., airports in Cairo and Moscow), a 34 
percent lower level of their foreign activities in terms of value in 2004 as compared to 1999 is 
difficult to explain. Similarly, the decline in both exports and imports of insurance and financial 
services would be tough to explain in view of the restructuring of the financial sector and 
burgeoning trade in goods in 2001-2004. In a similar vein, consider the developments in transport 
services juxtaposed against trade in goods and the expansion in ‘producer-driven’ network trade 
(See Section 5). The value of total trade turnover in goods in 2004 more was more than twice 
(2.16) as high as its value in 2001, while trade in transport services rose merely 56 percent or 
slightly more than half of the increase in goods trade. Simultaneously, ‘producer-driven’ network 
trade, critically dependent on smooth functioning of logistic services blocs, has been the driver of 
this expansion with its share in total trade turnover increasing from 15 percent in 2000 to 17 
percent in 2003. It is hard to imagine that this two-way trade has not involved provision of 
transport and other services paid or provided by non-resident providers. 
While the relationship between growth in goods trade and transport services purchased 
abroad or sold to foreign contractors is rarely linear, the gap between respective increases is 
seldom that high. It is even more unusual when they move in opposite direction as trade in goods 
and trade in transport services did in 1999-2003, with the ratio of the latter to the former falling 
from 7.5 percent in 1999 to 6.8 percent in 2001 and 4.3 percent in 2003. The ratio slightly 
rebounded to 4.9 percent in 2004.  
Furthermore, the developments in Turkey’s services trade in categories other than travel 
and, to a lesser extent, transport, in 1999-2004 defy trends observed worldwide. We may safely 
assume that other service categories lumped together cover, among others, trade in computer, 
business and other services (see Table 3 above), which is used as a proxy for outsourcing (the 
contracting of business functions to an outside suppliers). A dramatic decline in other than travel 
and transport services trade from US$ 5.2 billion in 2000 to US$ 1.2 billion in 2004 indicates that 
Turkish firms failed to attract offshore services. Countries that have attracted business services 
are not only the English-speaking ones, although India and Ireland have been very successful. In 
2003 Estonia, China and Morocco recorded the largest increase exports of computer and business 
services—the value of these exports over a previous year increased 70 percent, 68 percent and 61 
percent respectively.  
Thus, the critical question is what happened to trade in services in other categories than   10
travel and transport; although the latter’s poor performance remains unanswered. It is not clear 
what explains volatility and collapse in their trade. It remains unclear whether unusual patterns in 
Turkish trade in services are simply a statistical mirage or they reflect deeper structural barriers to 
this trade. Given its performance in trade in goods, one is tempted to blame the quality of 
statistics rather than idiosyncrasies of Turkey’s mode of integrating into global economy. 
Whatever the answer might be, it needs to be found simply because services statistics provide 
important inputs to economic policy making. 
C. Trade in goods and services in comparative perspective: expanding aggregate trade openness 
Looking solely at trade turnover per capita does not provide a good base for an 
assessment of a country’s involvement in world trade (Figure 3). Turkey’s trade turnover per 
capita in 2004 puts it close to the bottom of EU-8, SEE-3 and EU candidate economies. It is 
higher than only trade turnover per capita of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro and Albania. On 
the other hand, however, Turkey’s turnover is pretty close to Romania’s trade turnover per capita. 
But this is highly misleading, as Turkey’s population is almost double that of the largest country 
among the EU-8, Poland; more than triple of that of Romania (the second most populous 
country); and 52 times larger than the least populous, Estonia. Larger population implies a larger 
domestic economy less dependent on foreign trade. 
Figure 3: Trade in goods per capita in Turkey and other ‘EU-related’ European countries in 
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Source: Trade as reported to the UN COMTRADE database and population data from WDI. 
In fact, Turkey ranks very high in terms of trade openness and integration into global 
markets if variables determining a country’s dependence on foreign trade are taken into account. 
Its actual trade relative to GDP in 2003 exceeded the level generated by an empirical model 
developed for 149 countries. The model regresses openness, defined as the share of goods in 
GDP, on the country’s population, distance to major markets and GDP per capita (World Bank 
2005). Its results are theoretical or potential shares of goods exports and imports in the GDP. If 
the potential (predicted) share is below its actual share, then a country ‘under-trades.’ If the 
reverse is the case, then a country’s involvement in global trade is larger than its size, level of 
economic development, as proxied by the GDP per capita, and distance to world’s most important 
markets would indicate. 
Turkey like most of new Central European members of the EU (EU-8) appears to be   11
measurably over-trading by around one-third. Turkey’s 2003 realization ratio of 1.31 indicates 
that the actual ratio of trade to GDP (25 percent) was 31 percent over its ratio predicted by the 
model. It compares very favorably with the level of openness of new Central European members 
of the EU (EU-8), which had the average realization ratio of 1.35. Turkey’s realization ratio was 
roughly similar as Slovenia’s (1.33) but higher than that for Bulgaria (0.94) and Poland (0.92), 
both traded below their respective potential, Romania (1.02), Latvia (1.04), Lithuania (1.09) as 
well as above the average for other Balkan countries (0.65). Each country of the latter as a group 
traded well below its current potential as reflected by the estimated model.   
Turkey’s trade integration into global markets for goods has significantly expanded over 
the last two decades. This was mainly the result of expanding exports in the second half of the 
1980s and in the 2000s. Turkey’s share in world imports remained relatively unchanged in 1990-
2003 at around 0.8 percent, although it displayed an upward trend in 2000-2004. Its share in 
world exports, however, rose rather dramatically by 50 percent in 2000-2003. This was in marked 
contrast to the developments in the 1990s when Turkey exports growth simply kept with the pace 
of the growth of world exports. Turkey’s share of 0.4 percent was relatively stable throughout the 
1990s (Table 5). 
Table 5: Turkey in world trade in regional perspective in 1993, 1996 and 2004 
                  Change in percent (%) 
           1993           1996           2000           2004       1993-2004       2000-2004 
 Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
               Value in billion of US dollar     
Turkey  15.3 29.4 23.1 42.5 27.8 54.5 62.9 97.3 310 232  127  79
EU-8  49.2 62.2 83.6  115.4 118.8 154.1 254.5 297.9 417 379  114  93
Bulgaria  2.3 4.5 4.8 4.9 4.8 6.4 9.4 14.2 304 216  97  123
Romania  4.9 6.5 7.6  10.0 10.4 13.1 23.5 32.6 380 399  126  150
               Share in world (in %)     
Turkey  0.41 0.77 0.44 0.79 0.43 0.83 0.69 1.03 68 33  59  24
EU-8  1.32 1.64 1.58 2.14 1.86 2.34 2.80 3.15 111 92  50  35
Bulgaria  0.06 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.15 65 27  38  55
Romania  0.13 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.34 96 100  59  74
Notes: EU-8 countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic 
and Slovenia. 
Source: IMF DOT Statistics. 
Turkey’s export performance has been in line with that of EU-8 and Romania and well 
above Bulgaria’s performance. The latter’s share in world exports in 2003 was slightly below in 
1993, whereas that of Turkey was 52 percent higher. The difference between Turkey and EU-8 
and Romania is relatively small considering that dynamics of geographic reorientation of trade 
away from the former Soviet Union drove their trade in 1992-96 following the collapse of central 
planning. While between 1990 and 1993, exports from Turkey were growing at roughly the same 
pace as those from the EU-8, the situation subsequently changed. The ratio of EU-8 share in 
world exports to that of Turkey increased from 3.2 in 1990 and 1993 to 4.3 in 2000 and then fell 
to 4 in 2004 indicating Turkey’s stronger export growth performance (based on IMF DOT 
statistics). 
Indeed, Turkey’s share in world exports rose 59 percent from 0.4 percent in 2000 to 0.7 
percent in 2004 while that of the EU-8 as a group rose 50 percent. Only Romania the top export 
performer among Central European countries during that period—matched Turkey’s record.  
On the other hand, Turkey had the weakest performance among these countries in terms 
of imports. Its share in world imports, like that in exports, did not budge in the 1990s. It increased   12
merely 24 percent in 2004 over 2000, which was by far the smallest increase among comparators. 
Since export growth was so much stronger, with the export coverage of imports rising from 58 
percent in 2000 to 74 percent in 2004, it would appear that import content of exports has declined 
as domestically produced inputs replaced imports.  
In spite of these developments, Turkey’s aggregate trade openness (goods exports plus 
imports to GDP) increased from an average of 32 percent in 1990-99 to 48 percent in 2000-04. It 
was also well above the level indicated by Turkey’s size, GDP per capita and distance from major 
world’s markets. From this perspective, Turkey has been as successful as Slovenia. 
Exports of goods were a bright spot in Turkey’s overall performance in 2000-04. The 
export performance gap between EU-8 and Turkey, which significantly increased between 1993 
and 2000, similarly considerably fell in 2000-03, although it remained higher than in 1990 and 
1993. Turkey’s export performance has been strongly reminiscent of that of Romania, a late 
reformer among transition economies, whose exports dramatically picked up in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. Both countries registered a 50 percent increase in respective shares in world exports. 
While, as discussed earlier, statistics on Turkey’s performance in trade in services raise 
doubts as to their quality, Turkey’s overall position in terms of services trade per capita vis-à-vis 
other EU associates and new members is similar to that in trade in goods. It is above the levels in 
two former Yugoslav republics—Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro—and Romania, which 
swapped respective positions in the ranking with Albania (Figure 4). 































Source:  IMF Balance of Payments database. 
Trade in services plays, however, much more important role in Turkey’s trade than per 
capita statistics would indicate. The share of services in total trade was 18 percent in 2004, which 
is well above this share in trade of most other “EU-related’ European economies. Albania (41%), 
Croatia (35%), Estonia (25%) and Latvia (20%) had a higher share of services in total trade. 
D. Reorientation of foreign trade away from Middle East towards Pan-European markets 
A very significant reorientation of Turkey’s foreign trade towards the EU did not occur 
after entry into force of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement on 1 January 1996 but much 
earlier. In fact, 1996 marked historically the highest share of the EU-15 in Turkey’s total trade 
turnover. The striking feature of Turkey’s dynamics in geographical pattern of foreign trade has 
been the stability in the share of the EU-25 in total trade turnover since 1996. Interestingly, the   13
disruption in the earlier observed trend of the expanding trade with the EU-15, with its share 
increasing from 40 percent in 1985 to 50 percent in 1995, coincided with the entry into force of 
the Customs Union Agreement. Subsequently, the share remained at around 50 percent in 1996-
2000, fell to 47 percent in 2001 and stabilized at 48 percent in 2002-03 (Table 6).  
Table 6: Direction and dynamics of Turkey’s trade in 1985, 1995 and 2001-2004 (in million of 
US dollars and percent) 




.  Export Share (%) 
Partner  1985  1995  2002 2003 2004 1995=100 2000=100 1985 1995 2002 2003 2004
Pan-Euro: of which  3,693  12,695  20,886 28,255 37,694 127  234  46.4 58.8 58.4 59.8 59.7
EU(15) 3,398  11,077  18,331 24,488 32,575 130  226  42.7 51.3 51.3 51.8 51.6
EU-10  107  840  1,210 1,734 2,332 97  285  1.4 3.9 3.4 3.7 3.7
EU(25) 3,506  11,917  19,541 26,222 34,907 128  229  44.1 55.2 54.6 55.5 55.3
EFTA(3) 133 293 406 538 658 110  204  1.7 1.4  1.1  1.1  1.0
Bulgaria  8  183  378 622 894 138  355  0.1 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.4
Romania  47  302  560 873 1,235 108  380  0.6 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
ROW: of which  4,265 8,904  14,876 18,998 25,426 127  224  53.6 41.2 41.6 40.2 40.3
SEE(5)  33  166  386 570 740 191  233  0.4 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2
NAFTA(3)  527 1,616 3,654 4,016 5,343 203  163  6.6 7.5 10.2  8.5  8.5
Russia  0  1,232  1,168 1,368 1,859 52  291  .. 5.7 3.3 2.9 2.9
East  Asia  44  340  541 955 758 59  380  0.5 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.2
MENA 3,315 3,019 4,298 6,567 9,512 107  295  41.7 14.0 12.0 13.9 15.1
World  7,958  21,599  35,762 47,253 63,121 127  230  100 100 100 100 100
   Imports ($ million)     Import Share (%) 
Pan-Euro: of which  4,706  18,931  28,148 38,570 52,045 156  176  41.5 53.0 54.9 55.6 53.4
EU(15) 4,228  16,862  23,289 31,696 42,359 157  160  37.3 47.2 45.4 45.7 43.4
EU-10  111  407  1,214 1,833 3,116 191  401  1.0 1.1 2.4 2.6 3.2
EU(25) 4,339  17,269  24,502 33,529 45,475 158  167  38.3 48.4 47.8 48.4 46.6
EFTA(3)  205  892  2,483 3,396 3,911 129  340  1.8 2.5 4.8 4.9 4.0
Bulgaria  99  402  507 689 959 115  207  0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Romania  64  368  657 956 1,700 183  253  0.6 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.7
ROW: of which  6,634  16,777  23,122 30,770 45,495 147  185  58.5 47.0 45.1 44.4 46.6
SEE(5)  114  61  46 87 202 153  216  1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
NAFTA(3) 1,322 4,101 3,434 3,841 5,234 102  125  11.7 11.5  6.7  5.5  5.4
Russia  0  2,082  3,863 5,451 9,033 186  233  .. 5.8 7.5 7.9 9.3
East  Asia  160  1,023  2,218 3,865 6,451 205  307  1.4 2.9 4.3 5.6 6.6
MENA 3,669 3,830 5,065 6,577 8,373 140  156  32.4 10.7  9.9  9.5  8.6
World  11,341  35,707  51,270 69,340 97,540 152  180  100 100 100 100 100
Notes: EU-10 includes new members of the EU as of May 1, 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia); SEE-5 includes Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro: NAFTA-3 includes Canada, Mexico and the 
U.S.;MENA refers to Middle-East and North Africa and EFTA-3 include Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
Source: Derived from UN COMTRADE database as reported by Turkey. 
A dramatic fall in the importance of Middle East and North Africa in Turkey’s trade 
turnover accompanied reorientation of trade towards the EU-15 in 1985-1990. While Middle East 
and North African countries accounted for 36 percent of total trade turnover in 1985, this share 
fell to 17 percent in 1990. Subsequently, trade turnover with this region has kept pace with 
Turkey’s total trade, with its share remaining at 11-12 percent.
3 Had the share of Middle East and 
North Africa remained at its 1985 level, the share of the EU-15 would have remained unchanged 
                                                           
3 MENA countries took 74 percent of Turkish exports to ROW in 1985 and only 31 percent in 1995-2003.  
Imports from MENA accounted for 52 percent in 1985. By 1995 they fell to 21 percent and 18 percent of 
ROW imports in 2003.   14
at around 40 percent in 1985-2004 and trade with MENA would have amounted to US$ 42 billion 
rather than US$ 18 billion in 2004, despite its significant increase in 2004. The aggregate value of 
exports to this region increased 53 percent in 2004 as compared with the increase of total exports 
amounting to 34 percent. 
The inclusion of other Pan-European partners changes the overall picture, as their share 
in Turkey’s trade expanded until 2002 growing from 4 percent in 1985 to 9 percent of total trade 
in 2002 and 2003. This drove up the share of Pan-European countries in Turkish trade from 55 
percent in 1995 to 57 percent in 2003. Their aggregate share in exports increased from 59 percent 
in 1995 to 60 percent in 2003 and in imports from 53 percent to 56 percent in respective years 
(Table 6 above). 
These comments notwithstanding, Turkey’s integration into Pan-European markets 
appears to be higher and deeper than the respective shares alone would suggest. High levels of 
intra-industry and intra-product trade (see Sections 3 and 4) tie together production facilities 
across Pan-European borders. Furthermore, despite sluggish import demand in three Turkey’s 
major trading partners in the EU—Germany, Italy and France—taking together 30 percent of its 
exports, Turkish exports experienced impressive growth rates and Pan-European markets have 
driven this growth. The expansion in exports to Bulgaria and Romania is particularly noteworthy. 
E. Dynamics and factors accountable for growth of EU-destined exports in regional perspective 
Turkey’s export performance in EU-markets has been impressive even when cast against 
other EU Eastern Enlargement countries—EU-8 and EU candidate countries. Turkey continued 
its preferential commercial relations with the EU in the 1990s that began with the 1963 Ankara 
Agreement, whereas EU-8 together with Bulgaria and Romania had an extra, one-time potential 
for trade expansion following the collapse of central planning in 1989-90. Since central planning 
collapsed about a decade after the process of trade liberalization began in Turkey and Central 
European countries obtained duty-free access to EU industrial markets around two decades later 
than Turkey, one-time redirection combined with catch-up dynamics had driven their EU-oriented 
exports in the 1990s. These factors were not present in Turkish performance, as trade with the EU 
was not suppressed by market access or political considerations related to the now-defunct 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance regional arrangements. Hence, no similarly 
extraordinary factors shaped Turkish trade with the EU in the 1990s.  
The developments in the 1990s fully corroborated these expectations, albeit with two 
caveats. First, transition economies that swiftly implemented first-generation reforms (price, 
foreign trade and exchange rate liberalization) indeed experienced massive growth of EU-
oriented exports already in the early 1990s. Those that delayed them or aborted them either 
entered the path of strong growth in the late 1990s (Romania) or only recently (Bulgaria), albeit 
the latter at less impressive growth rates. Second, the gap between Turkey’s performance and that 
of EU-8 economies was smaller than one might anticipate and was closed over the last five years. 
Furthermore, Turkey consistently outperformed two other EU candidate countries—Bulgaria and 
Croatia—in 1993-2004. 
The data, both in current values and in terms of shares in EU external imports, provide 
empirical support to these observations. Since changes in the exchange rate of the US dollar vis-
à-vis Euro may distort dynamics of exports even examined in a comparative perspective, Table 7 
and Figure 5 present the evolution of shares of Turkey in EU external imports against those of its 
regional partners—EU-8, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. First, leaving aside Croatia, other 
groups or countries—including both Bulgaria and Romania—registered much larger increase in 
their respective shares in EU external imports than Turkey in 1993-96. Turkey’s share was 14 
percent larger at the end of this period, Bulgaria’s 29 percent and EU-8 63 percent. But two years 
later in 1998, Turkey’s share was 13 percent over its 1996-level, Bulgaria’s also 13 percent,   15
Romania’s 19 percent and EU-8 16 percent. Overall, between 1993-99 Turkish exports outpaced 
growth in EU-25 external demand to the tune of 5 percent, which was above the performance of 
Bulgaria (4 percent) and Croatia (-2 percent), but below that of Romania (10 percent) or EU-8 (12 
percent). 
Table 7: EU-25 external imports from EU candidate states in 1996-2004 and their shares in EU-
25 external imports (in percent and billion of US dollars) 




 Least Sq. 
Growth (%) 








Turkey  8.4 12.9 13.8 15.5 16.6 16.8 19.1 22.3 29.9 35.4 153  274  11.0 19.4
Bulgaria  1.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.5 4.6 5.4 178  233  10.1  14.9
Croatia  2.8 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 4.1 107  137  -2.9  13.1
Romania  2.2 4.9 5.5 6.3 6.7 7.7 9.2 10.5 13.9 16.1 221  325  16.8  18.9
Memo:          
EU-8  34.5 66.5 71.1 82.6 86.2 95.4 105.1 114.6 154.0 172.9 193  260  14.3 15.7
   Share in EU25 External Imports (%)      
Turkey  1.53 1.73 1.79 1.97 2.02 1.80 2.08 2.44 2.70 2.88 113  166 4.6 11.9
Bulgaria  0.24 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.44 131  141 3.7  7.5
Croatia  0.51 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.34 79  83  -9.4  5.7
Romania  0.41 0.66 0.71 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.99 1.15 1.26 1.31 163  197  10.3 11.5
Memo:          
EU-8  6.28 8.92 9.19  10.49 10.49 10.24 11.42 12.53 13.88 14.07 142  158 7.8  8.3
Source: Based on EU as reporter from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Figure 5: Change in shares in EU external imports in 1992-2004 (1996=100) 
Source: As in Table 7. 
Second, once extraordinary factors accountable for the trade performance of former 
Centrally Planned economies waned away, Turkey emerged in 2000-04 as one of the top export 
performers even taking as the base Turkey’s share in EU external imports in 1999 (2.03 percent) 
instead of a depressed one in 2000. This would lower its growth rate of the share from 14 percent 
to still respectable 9 percent per year as compared with 10 percent for EU-8. 
Hence, the time profile of changes in Turkey’s share in EU import demand in 1996-2004 
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Bulgaria and Romania. The former stands out because of a weaker performance, whereas the 
latter due to a stronger performance throughout the whole period. They experienced slow down in 
1998-99 (Turkey also a contraction in 2000) and subsequently impressive expansion (Figure 5). 
The increase in Turkey’s share by 10 percent in 2003 over 2002 was larger than for the EU-8 and 
Romania—both 9 percent.  
Similarities between the aggregate performance of the EU-8, which in terms of 
population roughly equals Turkey’s, and Turkey go beyond the time profile over 1996-2003. The 
factors accountable for the improvement in their export performance in EU markets have been 
also similar. One may distinguish three factors accountable for change in exports—import 
demand, competitiveness and diversification. When a country merely maintains its share in 
imports, the increase in exports is to the growth in import demand. When it increases more than 
import demand, then these extra exports can be attributable to increased competitiveness. When 
the increase comes from new exports, it is due to the diversification effect. Table 8 presents the 
results of calculations of factors of growth in EU-15 oriented exports of EU Eastern Enlargement 
countries in 2000-04 using four-digit SITC data for EU imports. For each four-digit SITC sector, 
the shares of regional suppliers in EU imports are calculated for 2000 and 2004. The growth in 
import demand was accountable for 52 percent of the increase in Turkish exports between 2000 
and 2004, the growth in competitiveness for 48 percent of the increase, and the growth in 
diversification for 1 percent of the increase in exports. Decomposed factors accountable for the 
expansion of Turkey’s EU-15-oriented exports are very similar to those explaining the growth in 
exports from the EU-8 economies. Except for Croatia, other countries have capitalized not only 
on the EU-15 demand for exports due to income growth but also succeeded in exploiting cost-
effective advantages.   
Table 8: Sources of growth in EU-oriented exports in regional perspective in 2000-04 
            Exports ($ million)          Source of Change (%)   Share in Total Exports
    Change  in Competi- Diversif- (%)  (%)
Exporter 2000  2004  2000-04 Demand tiveness ication 2000  2004
Bulgaria 2,834  5,066  2,232 38 58 4 1.8  1.8
Croatia 1,910  3,315  1,405 66 7 27 1.2  1.2
Romania 7,134  15,138  8,004 37 62 2 4.5  5.3
Turkey 16,220  33,353  17,133 52 48 1 10.3  11.6
EU-8 80,521  145,765  65,243 53 46 1 51.3  50.7
Total above  108,619  202,636  94,017 51 47 2 69.1  70.5
Memo:      
All ECA Countries  157,082  287,317  130,235 44 58 -2 100.0  100.0
Note: In addition to EU Eastern Enlargement countries, ECA includes South Eastern Europe (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States) economies (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics with the EU as a reporter. 
Turkey’s export performance in EU markets also stands out against other European and 
Central Asian countries. While the share of Bulgaria and Croatia in total EU-oriented exports 
from the European and Central Asian region remained stable, those of Romania, Turkey and EU-
8 significantly increased demonstrating superior performance vis-à-vis CIS economies. Turkey’s 
share grew from 10 percent to 12 percent in 2000-04. Overall, the share of EU Eastern 
Enlargement economies increased from 69.3 percent in 2000 to 70.5 percent in 2004.  
F. Concluding observations 
The analysis provides empirical support to the following observations. First, thanks to 
steady expansion of trade in goods and services since the mid-1980s, Turkey has become highly   17
integrated into the world economy. While exports have steadily expanded demonstrating relative 
insensitiveness to balance of payments crises, imports have been volatile, with their annual 
changes highly correlated with GDP growth rates. Relative to its geographical location, i.e., 
distance from major world markets, the level of GDP per capita and its size, Turkey ‘overtrades’ 
with the world. Its actual trade is higher than predicted by the regression model and its magnitude 
in line with ‘over-trading’ of the EU-8 taken as aggregate. 
Second, although Turkey’s geographical concentration of trade has increased since the 
mid-1980s, its pattern remains relatively diversified with significant shares of Middle East and 
North African countries and NAFTA. The increase in concentration was the result of expanding 
trade with the EU and stagnation in Middle East and North African trade, which took place in 
1985-90. The share of the EU-15 increased from 40 percent in 1985 to 48 percent in 1990. 
Subsequently, it remained stable at around 47-50 percent of Turkey’s total trade turnover. So did 
it in trade with MENA at around 12 percent of the total, after its share fell from 36 percent to 17 
percent over the same period of time. 
Third, Turkey’s export performance in 1996-2004 in EU markets bears strong similarities 
to aggregate performance of EU-8 but not to other EU candidate countries. It was much better 
than that of Bulgaria or Croatia but not as dynamic as that of Romania. While because of earlier 
‘trade repressive’ membership in the CMEA or the former Soviet Union, trade reorientation and 
the dynamics of catching up with levels determined by economic rather than political 
considerations were responsible for the surge in EU-destined exports of EU-8 in 1993-96, the 
differences in respective performance disappeared in 1997-2004 with Turkish exports displaying 
strong growth in 2001-03. Furthermore, similar factors drove their export expansion with the 
improved competitiveness in EU markets accounting for almost half of the increase in exports. 
4.  Changing patterns of specialization: degree of processing, technological level 
and factor intensities 
Industrial products have driven export expansion in 1996-2003. Their share in total 
exports rose from 80 percent in 1995-96 to 85 percent in 2000-01 and 88 percent in 2003-03. This 
share in Turkish exports to Pan-European free trade area for industrial products, which took 61 
percent of Turkish industrial exports, was 90 percent in 2003 up from 81 percent in 1995. 
Industrial products are a highly heterogeneous group, which raises several questions. What 
products drove the expansion? What do the changes in exports depending on the degree of 
processing embodied in exported products tell us about Turkey’s industrial capacities? What is 
the level of technology embodied in imported and exported products? What characteristics do 
new star performers embody in terms of technology and the degree of processing? 
A. Degree of processing in Turkey’s trade 
The composition of trade in terms of end-use product categories sheds light on changes in 
the domestic demand for various goods depending on the extent of their processing as well as a 
country’s capacity to produce more complex products. Both exports and imports may move in 
similar directions as the capacity to produce more processed goods may require imports of higher 
processed components. Overall, however, industrial development is associated with the increase 
in net exports, which can be expressed as percent of their imports, of products representing higher 
level of processing. A taxonomy of end-use products allows distinguishing between traditional 
production inputs (foods and feeds together with industrial raw materials) and processed 
manufactures (machinery together with automobiles and parts). The increase in the weight of the 
latter in total imports and exports combined with the increase in coverage of these imports by 
their exports points to the growing level of industrial processing carried out in a country. 
Data tabulated in Table 9 indicate a significant increase in the level of processing   18
embodied in trade. Consider first that the shares of traditional inputs in Turkey’s exports fell from 
30 percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 1995, and 13 percent in 2002-04. There was a similar trend in  
imports, with their share declining from 18 percent in 1995 to 13 percent in 2000-04. While 
Turkey has been as a rule close to being a net exporter of foods and feeds, industrial materials 
export coverage of their imports has been falling. 
Table 9: Exports and net exports of end-use product categories to Pan-European area and ROW 
in 1995, 2000-04 (in million of US dollars and percent) 
    Export ($ million)  Export Share (%)    LS Growth 
Pan-Euro Area  1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2000-04  (%)
Agricultural Food & Feeds  2,365  1,940 2,087 2,673 3,469 18.6 12.0 11.8 10.0 9.5  9.2  13.9 
Industrial Raw Materials  359  477 443 591 837 2.8 3.0 2.4 2.1 2.1  2.2  14.2 
Machinery, excl. Auto  999  2,385 3,462 4,912 6,624 7.9 14.8 14.7 16.6 17.4  17.6  26.6 
Automobiles & Parts  444  1,013 2,290 3,711 6,427 3.5 6.3 9.5 11.0 13.1  17.0  44.7 
Textiles & Clothing   6,284  7,089 8,412 10,621 12,187 49.5 43.9 40.9 40.3 37.6  32.3  14.5 
Other Consumer Goods  1,993  3,065 3,866 5,419 7,715 15.7 19.0 19.3 18.5 19.2  20.5  22.9 
Fuels   250  173 325 326 436 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.2  1.2  20.9 
All Goods  12,695  16,141 20,886 28,255 37,694 100 100 100 100 100  100  21.4 
ROW          
Agricultural Food & Feeds  2,173  1,887 1,873 2,567 3,009 24.4 16.6 16.7 12.6 13.5  11.8  10.8 
Industrial Raw Materials  355  347 348 439 628 4.0 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.3  2.5  14.1 
Machinery, excl. Auto  615  1,709 1,879 2,472 3,465 6.9 15.1 15.9 12.6 13.0  13.6  15.7 
Automobiles & Parts  282  533 979 1,419 1,726 3.2 4.7 4.5 6.6 7.5  6.8  32.1 
Textiles & Clothing   2,360  3,116 3,889 4,605 5,436 26.5 27.5 24.2 26.1 24.2  21.4  14.7 
Other Consumer Goods  3,078  3,629 5,547 6,838 10,164 34.6 32.0 34.7 37.3 36.0  40.0  24.6 
Fuels   40  124 362 659 999 0.5 1.1 1.4 2.4 3.5  3.9  54.1 
All Goods  8,904  11,344 14,876 18,998 25,426 100 100 100 100 100  100  19.7 
   Memo Items:   LS  Growth 
Pan-Euro Area  Exports in percent of Imports  Total Exports in percent of Imports  All Exports 
Agricultural Food & Feeds  139  148 147 153 172 102 93 142 101 101  108  12.4 
Industrial Raw Materials  29  58 43 35 39 34 38 52 32 28  25  14.1 
Machinery, excl. Auto  15  24 37 44 44 16 27 44 40 46  43  22.4 
Automobiles & Parts  39  22 115 80 76 48 29 127 142 96  81  41.2 
Textiles & Clothing   927  584 584 633 642 459 423 485 389 388  361  14.5 
Other Consumer Goods  27  29 32 32 36 46 43 60 55 52  55  23.8 
Fuels   92  17 48 34 41 6 3 5 8 8  10  39.4 
All Goods  67  55 74 73 72 60 51 76 70 68  65  20.7 
ROW    Pan-Euro Shares in World Exports  All Imports 
Agricultural Food & Feeds  78  68 74 74 76 52 51 49 53 51  54  12.9 
Industrial Raw Materials  41  26 24 22 17 50 58 56 56 57  57  28.7 
Machinery, excl. Auto  18  35 49 50 40 62 58 56 65 67  66  13.1 
Automobiles & Parts  74  62 325 199 101 61 66 74 70 72  79  23.2 
Textiles & Clothing   196  260 225 205 182 73 69 70 68 70  69  19.9 
Other Consumer Goods  82  71 112 102 91 39 46 43 41 44  43  20.3 
Fuels   0.9  1.5 4.3 6.2 7.4 86 58 57 47 33  30  11.6 
All Goods  53  46 64 62 56 59 59 58 58 60  60  16.9 
Note: End-Use categories are defined as Agricultural Food & Feeds (SITC 0+1+2+4-27-28), Industrial Raw 
Materials (SITC 27+28+68), Machinery, excluding auto (SITC 7-78), Automobiles & Parts (SITC 78), Textiles 
& Clothing (SITC 5+84), other Consumer Goods (SITC 5+6+8+9-65-68-84), Fuels (SITC 3) and All Goods 
(SITC 0 to 9). 
Source: Based on UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Second, exports of capital and transportation equipment and automobile parts have 
dramatically expanded while their imports have kept up with the overall growth of total imports. 
Their aggregate share in total exports increased from 7 percent in 1990 to 11 percent in 1995, 21 
percent in 2000 and 29 percent in 2004. Exports of machinery had a least square growth rate of 
27 percent and of automobiles and parts of 45 percent in 2000-04. Turkey was a net exporter of 
automobiles and parts in 2001 and 2002 mainly due to the fall in import demand due to a strong 
depreciation of Turkish lira following the balance of payments crisis in 2001. The value of 
imports of automobiles and parts fell 54 percent in 2001 and was still 42 percent below its 2000   19
level in 2002. In 2003, the value of imports exceeded by 21 percent the 2000 level mainly due to 
the surge in imports of trucks and tractors. But it rose 89 percent in 2004, with the value of 
exports also increasing 39 percent. The crisis also affected imports of automobile parts
4. Since 
this had no impact on exports automobiles and parts, which boomed in 2001-04, the contraction 
was short-termed mainly due to the falling domestic demand triggered by the crisis in 2001.   
Third, the expansion in exports of more processed goods took place in highly demanding 
and competitive Pan-European markets. Traditional industrial inputs accounted for a larger share 
in ROW-oriented exports (14 percent) than in pan-European exports (11 percent) in 2004. On the 
other hand, the aggregate share of machinery and automobiles and parts in Pan-European-
destined exports of 35 percent up from 30 percent a year earlier was below that of 21 percent up 
from 19 percent in 2003 in ROW exports. The difference is almost exclusively due to much larger 
Pan-European-oriented exports of automobiles and parts indicating Turkey’s participation in EU-
centered automotive networks. Pan-European countries took 79 percent of Turkey’s exports of 
automobiles and parts and 66 percent of exports of machinery—these compare favorably with the 
share of Pan-European area of 60 percent in total Turkish exports. 
The compositions of imports by end-use from Pan-European countries and ROW 
indicates Turkey’s growing integration into Pan-European markets based on trade in more 
processed industrial products. Imports from the Pan-European free trade area for industrial 
products are much more processed, with fuels, agricultural foods and feeds and industrial raw 
materials accounting for 10 percent. In contrast, this share in Turkey’s imports from ROW is 
more than four times as large.
5 Moreover, the gap appears to be growing. But ROW suppliers 
seem to have retained their competitive edge in Turkey’s markets for machinery and capital 
equipment excluding transportation.
6  
The falling share of machinery in Turkey’s total imports suggests weaker investment 
activity than in the past, which, in turn, may undermine future export growth. The value of their 
imports was in 2003 merely eight percent above the level in 2000. But they strongly rebounded in 
2004 increasing 46 percent, and stood at 158 of their 2000 level. Furthermore, the share of 
machinery increased in 2004 and accounted on average for one-fourth of total imports in 2000-
04—still a respectable level by international standards.
7 
 B. ‘Technology content’ of Turkey’s trade with the EU and competitiveness 
In order to assess the ‘technology content’ of Turkey’s trade with the EU, we use a 
simple taxonomy developed by Landesman and Stehrer (2003). It distinguishes among three 
categories of activities and assign to each of them products identified in trade statistics in terms of 
two-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC. Rev. 3). These categories are low 
technology and unskilled labor intensive activities, medium to high technology activities and 
resource intensive activities. The latter cover either extraction of mineral resources or 
unprocessed agricultural products. Low and labor intensive group includes textiles and clothing, 
wood products, most chemicals, tires, etc. The medium to high technology group includes 
machinery and equipment, transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, etc.  
                                                           
4  The contraction in imports of parts was smaller—they fell 41 percent in 2001; in 2002, they were 26 
percent below the 2000 level and 20 percent above in 2003. 
5  Between 1990 and 2003 it varied between 43 percent in 2003 and 48 percent in 1990. 
6 Their share in Turkey’s imports of these products has been stable at around 30 percent since 1985. 
7  This is roughly line with the share of machinery in imports of EU-8 economies but above that for 
Bulgaria, which was around 20 percent on average in 200-03.   20
As can be readily seen from Table 10, which presents Turkey’s exports and imports in 
terms of technological and resource intensity, the most visible change in Turkey’s EU-oriented 
exports has been a dramatic shift towards medium and high technology products. The value of 
their exports increased eight-fold between 1995 and 2004 growing at an average rate of 21.5 
percent over 1995-2003. The average rate of growth for low tech and unskilled labor intensive 
products was 5.4 percent and that for resource intensive products amounted to 9.9 percent.. If 
these growth rates continue over 2004-05, the value of exports of medium and high technology 
products will exceed that of low tech and labor intensive products by the end of 2005. The share 
of medium to high tech products rose from 13 percent in 1995 to 25 percent in 2000 and 37 
percent in 2004. The growth in exports was not solely the result of expanding EU import demand 
for these products but also of stronger competitiveness of Turkish suppliers. They increased their 
share in EU external imports of these products from 0.6 percent in 1995 to 0.9 percent in 2000, 
2.1 percent in 2003 and to 2.5 percent in 2004. 
Table 10:“Technology content” of trade with EU-25 and patterns of specialization in 1996, 
2000-2004 (in million of US dollars and percent) 
                            Index 2004 
Factor Input  1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1995=100  2000=100
   Turkey's Exports to EU25 ($ million)          
Low tech products & labor intensive  8,459 9,552 10,361 11,630 14,805 16,422 194  172
Medium to high tech products  1,623 4,112 5,325 7,041 10,297 13,157 810  320
Resource intensive products  2,078 3,087 3,398 3,579 4,729 5,708 275  185
   Turkey's Export Share (%)             
Low tech products & labor intensive  69.6 57.0 54.3 52.3 49.6 46.5 67  82
Medium to high tech products  13.3 24.5 27.9 31.6 34.5 37.3 279  152
Resource intensive products  17.1 18.4 17.8 16.1 15.9 16.2 95  88
   Exports in percent of Imports (%)          
Low tech products & labor intensive  402 430 546 479 510 507 126  118
Medium to high tech products  20 26 59 62 60 56 280  217
Resource intensive products  36 38 53 43 41 40 111  105
   Share in EU25 External Imports (%)          
Low tech products & labor intensive  5.9 6.5 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.3 142  129
Medium to high tech products  0.5 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.5 453  262
Resource intensive products  0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 151  132
   Export Specialization Index             
Low tech products & labor intensive  3.4 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.8 84  80
Medium to high tech products  0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 268  162
Resource intensive products  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 89  82
 Source: Computations based on EU25 data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Yet, low technology and unskilled labor intensive products still remain Turkey’s major 
specialization in EU markets. Turkey has a very strong revealed export specialization in EU 
markets for these products. The value of Export Specialization Index (ESI—ratio of their share in 
Turkish EU-oriented exports to their share in EU total external imports) is well below unity,
8 
albeit it has been declining. Turkish suppliers have a significant and growing presence in these 
markets. Turkish exports accounted for 8 percent of EU total imports of low tech and unskilled 
labor intensive products in 2003. Furthermore, Turkish exporters have been consistently 
outperforming other competitors, as their share in EU external imports of these products has been 
                                                           
8 The export specialization index (ESij) for a product j of country i, is specified here as follows: ESij = 
(xij/Xi) /(mj/M), where: xij is country i’s exports of product j to the EU; Xi = Σj xij is country i’s total 
exports to the EU; Mj = Σj xij is EU’s total ‘external’ imports of a product j; M = Σi Σj xij is EU’s total 
external imports. A value for this index below unity indicates a comparative disadvantage.  If the index takes 
a value greater than unity, the country is considered to have a "revealed" comparative advantage in the 
product. In this particular case, Turkey has a revealed comparative advantage in a product if its export of 
that item as a share of its total exports exceeds the EU imports of the item as a share of EU total imports.   21
steadily rising since 1995. 
Low technology and unskilled labor intensive products are also Turkey’s major source of 
net foreign currency earnings. Turkey is a huge net exporter of low technology and labor 
intensive products to the EU and net importer of medium to high tech products. Its exports of the 
former have been around five times higher in terms of value than imports from the EU generating 
export earnings to finance other imports. While Turkey is a large net importer of medium to high 
value products, their exports in terms of their imports significantly increased from 20 percent in 
1995 to 26 percent in 2000, 59 percent in 2001 and slightly fell to 56 percent in 2004. So did the 
imports. They were around three times higher in 2004 than in 1995. 
Relative stability of the time profile of ‘technology content’ of Turkey’s imports from the 
EU contrasts rather sharply with changes in ‘technology content’ of Turkish exports to these 
markets. Figure 6 presents respective shares of exports and imports from the EU in total ‘tech’ 
exports and imports excluding resource intensive products. The change in Turkish EU-oriented 
exports was very extensive, with the share of low tech and unskilled labor intensive products 
falling steadily from 90 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in 2000 and 56 percent in 2004. Over 1990-
2004, the share of ‘low tech and unskilled labor intensive’ products in Turkish imports from the 
EU oscillated between 13 percent (2000) and 20 percent (1995) and high and medium tech 
products between 77 percent and 80 percent. 
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Exports: 'low tech' products Exports:'medium to high tech' products
 
Source: Computations based on EU25 data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Hence, since around 1998 there has been a very strong shift towards products 
characterized by medium to high technology processes. Since exports of resource intensive 
products expanded broadly in line with total exports, the growth in the weight of medium to high 
tech products has been at the expense of low technology products. On the import side, the 
composition has been stable with medium to high technology products accounting for most of 
Turkey’s imports from the EU. 
EU markets have played a critical role in transformation of Turkish export basket. Table 
11 listing 20 top sectors, identified in terms of four-digit SITC products, ranked according to the 
value of exports to the EU (Table 11) provides a good illustration of it.
9 These sectors drove the 
                                                           
9 Sectors successful in global markets have also been successful in EU markets. Annex Table 1 provides 
the list of top twenty sectors in terms of the size of their worldwide exports. It is the same for total exports 
and EU-destined exports.   22
transformation, with their share in Turkish EU-destined exports increasing from 47 percent in 
2000 to 56 percent in 2004. Furthermore, the shares of exports to the EU of Turkey’s top 20 
exporters (71 percent) tend to be much higher than the average share of the EU in total exports 
(60 percent). Leaving aside clothing, this applies in particular to technologically more 
sophisticated sectors exporting automotive parts, electronics, etc. EU markets take 91 percent of 
motor vehicles for transport of goods, 90 percent of Turkey’s exports of television receivers and 
80 percent of parts of piston engines. Exports of household refrigerators, whose value of exports 
increased 2.7 times, expanded more to other markets following their success in EU markets, 
whose share fell from 80 percent in 2000 to 73 percent in 2003. The same pattern can be observed 
in the case of passenger motor cars. 
Table 11: Top twenty four-digit SITC exporters to the EU in 2004: exports, ranking, share in 






Index Export  share Ranking 
Share of EU 
in Exports 
SITC4     Product   2000  2004  2000=100  2000  2004  2000  2004  2000  2004 
7810 
Passenger motor cars, for 
transport   491  2,838  578  2.9  8.0 6 1  84  76 
8462 
Under garments, knitted of 
cotton  1,046  2,351  225  6.2  6.6 1 2  72  82 
7611  Television  receivers  768  1,971  256  4.6  5.6 3 3  90  91 
7821 
Motor vehicles for 
transport of goods  37  1,484  4,022  0.2  4.2  84  4  78  89 
8439  Other outer garments  729  1,399  192  4.3  4.0  4  5  64  73 
8451 
Jerseys, pull-overs, 
twinsets,  cardigans  870  1,155  133  5.2  3.3 2 6  83  79 
8459 
Other outer garments & 
clothing  593  1,111  187  3.5  3.1 5 7  73  75 
7849 
Other parts & accessories 
of motor vehicles  379  1,044  276  2.3  3.0  9  8  62  64 
6584 
Bed linen, table linen, toilet 
&  kitchen  461  888  193  2.7  2.5 7 9  74  66 
8423   
Trousers, breeches etc. of 
textile fabrics  431 747  173  2.6  2.1  8  10  71  66 
8472  Clothing  accessories  257  603  235 1.5 1.7 13 11 92 83 
0589 
Fruit otherwise prepared 
or  preserved  203  561  276 1.2 1.6 19 12 83 83 
7139 
Parts of internal 
combustible piston 
engines  189  554  293 1.1 1.6 20 13 76 77 
8463 
Under garments, knitted, 
of  synthetic  311  538  173 1.9 1.5 11 14 91 87 
6732  Bars & rods, of iron/steel  159  429  270  0.9  1.2  22  15  20  25 
0577  Edible  nuts  375  421  112 2.2 1.2 10 16 81 78 
7731 
Insulated elect.wire, cable, 
bars,  strings  278  396  142 1.7 1.1 12 17 61 49 
7752   
Household type 
refrigerators  157  395  251 0.9 1.1 24 18 81 70 
7831 
Public-service type 
passenger  motor  206  389  189 1.2 1.1 18 19 21 42 
6783 
Other tubes and pipes, of 
iron or steel  158  351  223  0.9  1.0  23  20  63  56 
   All above products  8,097  19,626  242  48.2  55.5        69  71 
0 to 9  All goods  16,803  35,378  211  100  100        55  55 
Source:  Derived from the UN COMTRADE database as reported by the EU. 
The composition of exports of top-twenty performers in terms of technology content and 
natural resource intensity also points to significant realignment in Turkish export offer. The share   23
of medium to high technology products in top-twenty rose from 25 percent in 2000 to 39 percent 
in 2004 almost exclusively at the expense of the fall in the share of low technology products from 
59 percent to 47 percent. Spectacular increases in exports of passenger cars and trucks and 
exports of boats and other vessels have been behind this change. 
C. Transformation in factor intensities of Turkish exports 
Patterns in trade in goods reflect differences in comparative advantage as determined by 
different factor endowments among countries. A country tends to export those goods that use its 
factors that are relatively abundant.
10 Exploring a full causal chain linking factor endowments, 
comparative advantage and trade patterns are not relevant for this discussion.
11 The question 
germane here concerns assessment of broad changes in relative factor intensities as revealed in 
Turkey’s trade with the EU and other Pan-European partners.  
Given the differences in respective endowments in factors of production, one would 
expect Turkey to export products to its Pan-European partners with significant content of natural 
resource and unskilled labor intensive products and import capital and skilled labor intensive 
products. Indeed, empirical data corroborate this expectation, but only on the import side. 
Turkey’s imports from the EU have been remarkable stable in terms of content over time, with 
capital and skilled labor intensive goods accounting for around 80 percent of Turkey’s imports. 
Like experiences only shared among EU-8 economies, Turkey has witnessed a very 
significant restructuring in factor intensities of its exports. The factor content of Turkish exports 
has undergone dramatic change indicating rapid movement towards higher value-added products 
(see Figure 7). The share of natural resource-based and unskilled labor intensive products has 
been falling, while that of capital- and skilled labor-intensive products has been rapidly 
expanding especially over the last four years. Skilled labor intensive products have been the 
major drivers of change. While in 1990 their share in total EU-oriented exports amounted to 10 
percent as compared with 54 percent for unskilled labor-intensive products, the former rose to 22 
percent and the latter fell to 49 percent in 2000. In 2004 these shares were 30 percent and 46 
percent, respectively. 
The shift away from products embodying natural resources and unskilled labor, which is 
a reflection of the development of more sophisticated industrial capacities competitive in global 
markets, has been quite significant even when cast against EU-8. The simple average of the 
aggregate share of skilled labor and capital intensive products in total EU-directed exports from 
the EU-8 increased 18 percentage points from 51 percent in 1996 to 69 percent in 2004 (Table 
12). This share in Turkey’s total exports increased 23 percentage points from 21 percent in 1996 
to 44 percent in 2004.  
                                                           
10 However, this fully takes place if there is a competitive market mechanism efficiently allocating 
resources By the same token, the persistence in disconnect between country’s endowments in factors of 
production and factor intensities of its exports point to major institutional and policy deficiencies in the 
existing economic regime. 
11 The goodness of results obtained hinges critically on the quality of a classification used to examine 
export baskets over time by factor mix. The choice is always controversial.  There are woeful difficulties to 
define and measure factor intensity, and trade theorists have long wrestled with it. Some definitions of the 
groups of goods by factor intensity are overlapping and non-exhaustive. Definitions used here do not suffer 
from these shortcomings--all industries are taken into account and an industry appears only in one 
classification; and the classification distinguishes among four types of factors. Since some industries are 
intensive in terms of more than one factor, the results may be distorted. But even assuming that the initial 
classification captures adequately factor proportions at a given point of time, with the passage of time it 
may provide a distorted picture. Some industries may become more capital-intensive or less active in 
technological terms.   24
Figure 7: Factor intensities of Turkey’s exports to the EU in 1990, 1995-2004 (in percent) 
 Source: Computations based on EU data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Table 12: Share of skilled labor and capital intensive products in total exports of EU candidate 
countries and EU-8 in 1996 and 2004 (in percent) 
                  1996                    2004         Percent Point Change 
  % Share in  Of which: % in % Share in  Of which: % in  % Share in  Of which: % in
Country/Group  Total Exports  Skilled Labor  Total Exports Skilled Labor  Total Exports  Skilled Labor 
Turkey  21  13  44 35 23  22 
Bulgaria 39  15  31  15  -7  0 
Croatia 33  10  34  11  1  1 
Romania 29  14  35  16  6  1 
EU-8 (simple average)  51  26  69  34  18  9 
Memo:               
SEE-4 (simple average)  20  10  27  16  7  6 
Note: SEE-4: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro 
Source: Computations based on EU-15 data as reported in UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
Turkey’s performance contrasted rather sharply with that of other EU candidate countries 
and South East European countries (SEE-4, see note in Table 12), which are parts of the EU 
Stabilization and Association process. While the aggregate share of skilled labor and capital-
intensive products in Turkish exports in 1996 was well below that in other comparator countries 
and groups except for SEE-4, the share in 2004 was the second largest after the EU-8. Between 
1996 and 2004 it increased seven percentage points in exports from SEE-4, six percentage points 
in Romania’s exports and 1 percentage point in Croatia’s exports. It fell seven percentage points 
in Bulgaria’s exports triggered by the increase in exports of unskilled labor intensive products 
rather than natural resource intensive products, as one might expect given Bulgaria’s endowments 
in factors of production.
12 
Another interesting feature of Turkey’s performance relative to other European transition 
economies—except for SEE-4 economies and Croatia—was that the levers of growth were skilled 
labor intensive products. They were responsible for 96 percent of the increase in the weight of 
these products in Turkish total exports between 1996 and 2004 as compared to 49 percent for the 
EU-8 economies and 25 percent for Romania. As for SEE-3 economies and Croatia the increase 
came also from exports of skilled labor intensive products accounting for 83 percent and 96 
percent of the respective changes. 
                                                           
12 The share of unskilled labor intensive products in Bulgaria’s exports increased from 17 percent in 1996 
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Indeed, skilled labor intensive products drove the expansion of Turkish exports in 2000-
04 and were the bright spot in export performance in 1996-2000 that barely kept pace with the 
growth in Pan-European external import demand. Exports of skilled labor intensive products 
grew on average (least square average) over 1990-2004 at 21 percent per year, with the growth 
clearly accelerating towards the end of this period. Least square average growth rates were 12 
percent for 1990-95, 22 percent for 1996-2000 and 31 percent for 2000-04. Improvements in 
competitiveness in Pan-European markets have been responsible for the expansion in exports 
since 1994. While in 1990-93 the share of skilled labor intensive products imported from Turkey 
in Pan-European external imports, as well as in EU-15 imports, was stable at around 1 percent, it 
increased to 1.2 percent in 1994 and kept growing every year in 1995-2004. Leaving aside a very 
small increase in the share of unskilled labor intensive products in 2000 over 1996 (0.1 
percentage point) in Pan-European imports of these products, skilled labor intensive products 
were the only group that increased its share during this period (Table 13). 
A sharp decline in the share of natural resource intensive products in Turkish exports has 
accompanied rapid growth in skilled labor intensive exports. After a steep decline in 1990-92, the 
share of natural resource products was stable until 1997. During this period the rise of skilled 
labor intensive products was at the expense of unskilled labor intensive products whose share fell 
from 58 percent in 1993 to 52 percent in 1997 (Figure 8). 
Capital intensive exports regained their vigor in 2000-03 following a period of relatively 
uninspiring performance in 1996-99. Their share in Turkey’s Pan-European exports stagnated in 
1996-99 after significantly expanding in 1990-94 from 6 percent to 9 percent and increased to 9.6 
percent in 2000, 10.3 percent in 2003 and slightly fell to 9.7 percent in 2004. 
Table 13: Factor content of Turkey’s Pan-European exports in 1996-2004 and their dynamics 
over 1999-2004 (in million of US dollars and percent) 
          Least Square Growth  
Factor  Intensity  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1990-95  1996-00  2000-04 
                                Turkey's Exports to Pan-Euro ($ million)   
Natural  Res.  3,496 3,606 3,478 3,643 3,318 3,586 3,494 4,414 4,991 3.6  -0.9 10.2
Unskilled  Labor  7,019 7,518 8,389 8,557 8,634 9,408 11,159 14,524 16,072 6.7  5.4 16.8
Capital  1,164 1,312 1,476 1,543 1,684 1,995 2,318 3,283 3,680 15.2  9.0 20.6
Skilled  Labor  1,777 1,984 2,841 3,556 3,929 5,087 6,532 9,637 13,198 11.8  21.7 30.6
All  above  goods  13,457 14,420 16,185 17,300 17,565 20,076 23,503 31,859 37,941 7.0  7.1 20.0
            Percent Points Change 
                                Export Share of Pan-Euro (%)  1990-95 1996-00 2000-04
Natural  Res.  26.0 25.0 21.5 21.1 18.9 17.9 14.9 13.9 13.2 -5.5  -7.1 -5.7
Unskilled  Labor  52.2 52.1 51.8 49.5 49.2 46.9 47.5 45.6 42.4 -0.6  -3.0 -6.8
Capital  8.6 9.1 9.1 8.9 9.6 9.9 9.9 10.3 9.7 2.5  0.9 0.1
Skilled  Labor  13.2 13.8 17.6 20.6 22.4 25.3 27.8 30.2 34.8 3.6  9.2 12.4
            Percent Points Change 
                                Share in Pan-Euro External Imports (%)  1990-95 1996-00 2000-04
Natural  Res.  1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 0.2  -0.2 0.2
Unskilled  Labor  8.2 8.1 8.7 8.8 8.3 9.1 10.4 11.1 11.5 1.0  0.1 3.2
Capital  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.1  0.0 0.4
Skilled  Labor  2.0 2.1 2.7 3.3 3.6 4.9 5.9 6.9 8.1 0.8  1.6 4.5
All  above  goods  2.0 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.5 0.3  0.0 1.5
Source: Computations based on Pan-European import data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
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Figure 8: Evolution in the factor content of Turkish Pan-European-destined exports over 1990-
2003(in percent) 
Source: As in Table 13. 
Developments in factor intensity of exports point to the growing importance of Turkey’s 
links to EU-8 as well as other Pan-European countries (Bulgaria, Romania and EFTA) aside from 
the EU-15. Pan-European markets other than those of the EU-15 have become increasingly 
receptive consumers of skilled labor and capital intensive products made in Turkey and engines 
of Turkey’s export growth. While Turkish exports to these markets have registered a stronger 
growth than in exports to EU-15 across all categories of products in terms of their factor 
intensities, growth differentials, however, were particularly large in capital and skilled labor 
intensive products. The value of exports of these products increased almost four-fold between 
2000 and 2004 from US$ 533 million to US$ 2,540 million. The growth of these exports was 
twice as fast as EU-15-destined exports of these products.  
Table 14: Developments in exports to non-EU-15 Pan-European economies in 1990, 2000 and 
2003 (in percent) 
 Composition  Least  Square  Growth 
Non-EU-15 in Turkey's 
Pan-Euro Exports 
Factor  Intensity  1990 1996 2004 1990-95  1996-00  2000-04  1990  1996  2004 
Natural  Resource  49.1  35.1  13.4  6.9  -0.4  17.6 6.3 9.5  13.4 
Unskilled  Labor  41.1  31.0  35.8  11.0  15.5  30.8 3.1 4.2  11.1 
Capital  4.3  16.2  14.0  43.9  2.4  37.0  3.0 13.2 19.0 
Skilled  Labor  5.4  17.7  36.8  36.3  21.3  41.5 2.3 9.4  14.0 
All above goods  100  100  100  15.0  10.1  32.7  4.0  7.0  13.2 
Source: Computations based on Pan-Euro and EU import data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
In contrast to export performance in 1990-95, skilled labor intensive products have 
subsequently become the major levers of export expansion to non-EU-15 Pan-European markets. 
While capital intensive products followed by skilled labor intensive exports drove the growth in 
1990-96, the latter drove the expansion in 1996-2003. The share of EU-15 in Turkish Pan-
European exports of skilled labor products fell from 98 percent in 1990 to 916 percent in 1996 
and 86 percent in 2004. 
Simultaneously, the factor content gap between EU-15-destined exports and those to 
other pan-European markets has been falling. While through the 1990s the EU-oriented export 
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unskilled labor intensive products, Turkish exports to other pan-European markets in terms of 
factor intensities began converging in 1999-2004. The difference between shares of natural 
resources products has become negligible and than between shares of unskilled labor intensive 
fell from around 20 percentage points in favor of the EU-15 in 1991-1998 to 9 percentage points 
in 2001-02.
13 Correspondingly, non-EU-15 pan-European exports had larger shares of capital and 
skilled labor intensive goods. In contrast, factor content of exports to non-Pan-European markets 
is different in two respects: it continues to be more natural resource based and less unskilled labor 
intensive.  
But even more significant is that the difference between respective export baskets in 2004 
is incomparably smaller than it was in 1996-98 indicating growing similarity in Turkey’s 
specialization patterns in Pan-European and other markets. While the share of natural resource-
based products has been falling in both Pan-European- and ROW-destined exports and the share 
of capital intensive has remained roughly unchanged, expansion in exports of skilled labor 
intensive products to Pan-European markets and that of unskilled labor intensive to ROW 
markets has driven the convergence. The latter trend, however, has begun to subside in 2002, 
with skilled labor intensive products recording the strongest growth in exports to both ROW and 
Pan-European countries in 2002-04. 
E. Conclusions 
In a nutshell, the picture of Turkey’s industrial development that emerges from the 
analysis through the lenses of the level of technology and factor content of foreign trade testifies 
to the emergence of modern industrial structures highly competitive in global and pan-European 
markets. Over the last five years, there has been a very pronounced shift towards production of 
goods requiring skilled labor and more sophisticated technologies. The shift is comparable in 
scope to that incurred by the EU-8 economies during the pre-accession period. Its major levers in 
both cases have been skilled labor and capital intensive products manufactured in operations 
characterized by medium to high technology. 
 Although low technology and unskilled labor intensive products together with resource-
based products still account for more than half of Turkish exports to Pan-European preferential 
partners, exports of medium to high technology products with high content of capital and skilled 
labor were the levers of the recent export expansion. If the average rates of export growth 
recorded in 2000-03 were sustained, the aggregate share of skilled labor and capital intensive 
products in total exports would exceed the 50 percent threshold in 2007.  
The shift towards products requiring more capital, better-trained labor force and more 
sophisticated technologies has two important consequences. First, industries intensive in skilled 
labor and capital tend to pay higher wages. It seems that the growth of exports in these sectors has 
boosted output growth and helped improve living standards. In contrast, exports of natural 
resource-based products that involve little processing do not have the similar effect on wages. 
 Second, the shift away from products embodying natural resources and unskilled labor 
competitive in global markets augurs well for future sustainability of exports. High wages in 
higher technology sectors lead also to higher wages in services (especially in non-tradables) and 
unskilled labor-intensive sectors, such as textiles and footwear. Given the growing competition 
from low-wage countries in Asia and elsewhere, these exports may not be sustainable over a 
longer term. On the other hand, capital and skilled labor intensive products are less sensitive to 
changes in labor cost. Sustainability of their exports hinges critically on the availability of high 
quality human capital and firms’ absorptive capacity of new technologies. 
                                                           
13 Another way of expressing the differences is sum of absolute differences between shares. This fell from 
an average of around of 45 in 1991-96 to 27 in 1999 and 18 percentage points in 2004.   28
Capital and labor have been moving to more sophisticated and higher value added 
activities and more processed goods with higher content of capital and skilled labor have been 
expanding faster than traditional inputs and unskilled labor intensive products.  
5.  Integration into EU production structures: participation in EU-driven value 
chains and networks 
The emergence of international production and distribution networks has triggered 
globalization of economic activities and revamped the economic landscape facing nations, 
industries and individual firms. Such networks, also known as commodity chains, refer to the 
whole range of activities involved in the design, production and marketing of a product. Its 
trademark is dividing up the value chain into smaller components and moving them to countries 
where their costs of production could be lower. One may distinguish between ‘buyer-driven’ and 
‘producer-driven’ value chains (Gereffi, 1999, p.41-42). The former refers to the case of global 
buyers creating a supply-base upon which production and distribution systems are built without 
direct ownership. We include in it textiles and clothing (TC), footwear and furniture. The 
‘producer-driven’ networks refer to vertically integrated arrangements as exemplified by 
automotive networks, information, and communication technology networks. 
Network trade has been also the driving force of EU-8 economies’ integration into global 
markets. The most developed of them have moved through two stages. First, ‘buyer-driven’ 
network exports have been the first major vehicle linking them to external markets. The point of 
departure has been as a rule inward processing in relatively technologically simple and capital 
non-intensive activities such as clothing often followed and/or accompanied in transition 
economies by footwear and furniture. The second stage has been participation in ‘producer-
driven’ networks. Engagement in global networks in electronics or automotive industry usually 
comes at higher stages of economic development. It marks moving to a new division of labor 
based on production fragmentation.  
Integration into EU-25 production and distribution value chains and networks structures 
has been the driver of Turkey’s increasing participation in division of labor based on outsourcing 
and production fragmentation. EU-25 absorbed 68 percent (together with other Pan-European 
countries 72 percent) of all Turkish network exports as compared to 56 percent of Turkish total 
exports (Table 15). Network exports to the EU have expanded rapidly, with their share in total 
EU-25-destined exports rising from 58 percent on average in 1995-99 to 62 percent in 2004.  
Furthermore, the share of markets other than the Pan-European free trade area for industrial 
products has been declining pointing to closer links of Turkish firms with multinationals 
operating out of the EU-25. 
Table 15: Significance of Pan-European markets in Turkish all network trade in 1995-99 and 
2000-04 and 2004 (in percent) 
  
  
Average share in Turkey's 
total networks' exports 
Average share in Turkey's 
all goods exports 
Share of  total network exports  in 
all goods exports to 
Market  1995-99 2000-04 2004  1995-99  2000-04 2004  1995-99  2000-04  2004 
EU-25  66.2  68.0 69.5  53.7  55.1 55.3  57.9  61.6  61.8 
Other  Pan-Euro  3.2  3.2 3.9  3.6  3.8 4.4  41.8  42.1  43.7 
ROW  30.6  28.8 26.6  42.7  41.1 40.3  33.7  35.0  32.5 
Note: Total networks include T&C, footwear, furniture, automobile and ICT chains. 
Source: Computations based on Turkey data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Network trade, accounting now for almost three-thirds of Turkey’s EU-destined exports, 
has also driven Turkey’s integration into EU markets in a pattern and sequence similar to that 
observed earlier in several EU-8 economies. While Turkey has not as yet moved fully to the 
second stage, the process appears to be at a full swing. The value of exports of parts and final   29
products from ‘producer-driven’ networks increased 178 percent in 2000-04, while those from 
‘buyer-driven’ networks increased by a very respectable 50 percent. As a result, the composition 
of network exports has been undergoing significant evolution, with their share in all networks’ 
exports increasing from 11 percent in 1990-96 to 23 percent in 2000 and 38 percent in 2004.  
This section examines in more detail Turkey’s place in evolving division of labor driven 
regionally by EU Eastern Enlargement Project. It assesses participation of Turkish firms in global 
chains organized around the EU-15 but also increasingly encompassing some recent EU entrants, 
mainly Hungary and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic that are becoming regional 
intermediaries in ‘producer-driven’ networks (Kaminski 2005). 
A. Participation in ‘buyer-driven’ value chains in comparative perspective 
‘Buyer-driven’ commodity chains tend to exist in industries in which large retailers, 
branded marketers and branded manufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized 
production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically in developing or transition 
economies.  This pattern has become common in labor-intensive, consumer goods sectors, such as 
apparel, footwear, etc. Our focus will be on three ‘buyer-driven’ chains: textiles and clothing 
(T&C); footwear; and furniture. The latter differs especially from T&C value chains, as it 
involves operations that tend to be more diversified and complex requiring larger local input of 
skills and investment in capital assets. Similarly to clothing and footwear, furniture producers 
operating in a global value chain supply products according to specification provided by large 
multinational retailers. They also tend to be locally owned, albeit not always,
14 but the 
relationship between supplier and multinational retailer frequently reflects larger complexity of 
tasks involved. In consequence, their relationship is based on a more long-term mutual 
commitment, which is less sensitive to the rise in labor costs and creates more opportunities for 
spillovers. 
Clothing and, to a lesser extent, footwear and furniture have been the quintessential 
engines of growth for many EU-8 and other European economies during the initial stages of 
transition. They have accounted for a significant share of value added and manufacturing 
employment, with consequential implications for poverty reduction. With increasing wages in 
successful reformers, many of outward processing operations in the clothing sector have been 
shifting to economies less advanced in the transformation process to take advantage of lower 
labor costs in other countries in Central and South East Europe through the 1990s. The dates 
when their share in exports of manufactures peaked indicates the end of T&C as engines of export 
growth. In contrast to Bulgaria and Romania as well as other SEE-4 economies, where T&C 
shares peaked only in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey followed the pattern 
of EU-8, with their share peaking in the early 1990s (Table 16). 
Despite a similar time profile, the share of T&C products in Turkish exports peaked at a 
much higher level than in the EU-8 economies and consequently still accounts—despite a very 
significant contraction of 16 percentage points—for a much larger share of the total export than in 
EU-8 exports. It is lower, however, than in exports originating in Bulgaria and Romania. Exports 
from these two countries had positive growth rates in 1995-04. Neither Turkey nor any EU-8 had 
positive growth rates of T&C exports during this period. Among EU-8 economies Latvia has the 
largest share of T&C chain products in its total exports. 
                                                           
14  Turkey and Romania stand out. Firms with foreign capital are present in Turkey’s clothing industries. 
For instance, four firms specializing in wearing apparel (excluding knit) account for 89 percent of total 
capital stock of this sector and 212 firms producing ready made garments account for 71 percent (MIT 
2004, p. 46). Foreign-owned firms, mainly Italian, tower the Romanian apparel and garment sector 
(Kaminski and Ng 2004).   30
Table 16: Shift away from clothing global value chain of EU-8 and share of clothing in exports 

















Share of T&C in ‘buyer-
driven’ chains’ exports in  
1995       2004   % point ch.
EU-8                 
Czech R.  1993  7.4  2.0    858  26  -11.1  70.7  64.3  -6.4 
Estonia  1993  27.5  7.0    279  25  -10.5  76.2  56.3  -19.9 
Hungary 1992  20.8  3.1  1,134  15  -15.8  71.0  64.5  -6.5 
Latvia  1994  22.7  14.6    271  64  -1.5  83.9  72.0  -12.0 
Lithuania  1999  34.8  19.3    678  56  -4.0  88.6  64.8  -23.8 
Poland 1993  21.4  4.3  1,834  20  -15.4  65.6  38.3  -27.2 
Slovak R.  1994  8.9  3.3    668  37  -8.7  69.3  54.4  -15.0 
Slovenia  1992  15.6  3.7    368  24  -12.2  62.7  41.0  -21.6 
SEE-4                            
Albania  2000  41.5  34.0    143  82  -1.6  57.6  45.7  -11.9 
BiH  1998  28.5  16.1    153  56  0.7  44.9  36.2  -8.6 
FYROM  2003  47.9  40.1    408  84  1.4  88.1  88.7  0.6 
S and M  1992  22.4  11.2    207  50  7.7  59.8  58.7  -1.1 
 EU-candidates                            
Bulgaria 2001  37.7  31.2  1,616  83  5.1  82.6  80.9  -1.7 
Croatia  1993  32.3  17.1    613  53  -5.7  67.6  64.6  -3.0 
Romania 1999  37.1  29.5  5,276  80 0.7  64.0  66.2  2.2 
Turkey 1992  46.9  27.2  12,057  58  -4.2  98.3  95.4  -2.9 
Note: Manufactured goods excluding chemicals 
Source: Computations based on world import data from UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
A feature setting Turkey aside from EU-8 firms’ involvement in ‘buyer-driven’ value 
chains is a relatively much smaller presence of furniture chains in exports of ‘buyer-driven’ 
chains. The value of their exports of US$ 180 million was about half of exports of furniture 
network and one-tenth of T&C exports (Table 17). In contrast to most EU-8, the T&C chain 
towers over other buyer-driven’ value chain with the share in total ‘buyer-driven’ chains’ exports 
at 96 percent in 2003. Except for Macedonia, the dominance of T&C chain is much less pointed 
in exports from other countries. 
Yet, Turkey appears to be moving along the same path that the EU-8 economies took 
earlier, with its furniture sector rapidly becoming integrated into international supply chains. 
Although the share of furniture network’s products in exports of manufactured goods (excluding 
chemicals) remains well below the levels in other transition pan-European countries,
15 there are 
some signs of change in EU-25-destined exports. The contraction, admittedly very small, in the 
share of T&C products in total exports of ‘buyer-driven’ chains from 99 percent in 2000 to 96 
percent in 2003 has been only because of the emergence of the furniture network as a significant 
exporter (Table 17). The value of exports of furniture network reached US$ 456 million in 2003, 
with its share in total ‘buyer-driven’ exports almost quadrupling from 0.8 percent in 1995 to 2.9 
percent in 2000 and further rising to 2.5 percent in 2003 and 3.3 percent in 2004.  
                                                           
15 The lowest share among EU-8 was 2 percent (Hungary) as compared to Turkey’s 1.5 percent. This share 
was the highest in Lithuania’s exports (13.4 percent) followed by Poland (11 percent), Estonia (10 percent) 
and Latvia (9 percent). In both Bulgarian and Romanian, the share was higher than in Turkey’s exports and 
amounted in 2003 to 3.4 percent and 5.5 percent respectively.   31
Table 17: Characteristics of ‘buyer-driven’ chains in terms of exports and imports in 1995, 2000 
and 2004 (in percent and million of US dollars) 
T&C chain  Footwear chain  Furniture network 
1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004
Network exports (US$ mill)  8,650 10,223 17,662 114 114 205 75  179  611
share in total 'buyer-driven' 97.9 97.2 95.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.8  1.7  3.3
Exports of parts (US$ mill.)  2,525 3,672 6,429 1 13 23 18  38  129
share in total 'buyer-driven' 99.2 98.6 97.7 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7  1.0  2.0
Network imports (US$ mill)  1,924 2,469 5,005 46 114 303 73  201  296
share in total 'buyer-driven' 94.2 88.7 89.3 2.2 4.1 5.4 3.6  7.2  5.3
Imports of parts (US$ mill.)  1,833 2,150 4,226 12 12 16 27  59  154
share in total 'buyer-driven' 97.9 96.8 96.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.4  2.7  3.5
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Export growth rates of each network exceeded the growth of the EU’s external import 
demand for these products. As a result, producers in ‘buyer-driven’ networks have succeeded in 
increasing their share in EU external imports through the combination of increases of exports of 
both parts and final products. Suppliers of footwear had the largest increase but from a very small 
base. Turkish T&C chain accounting now for around 15 percent of EU imports of textiles and 
clothing has also seen a substantial, 25 percent increase in its share in 2000-03. The presence of 
furniture network in EU markets is also visible, as suppliers of furniture parts account for more 
than 5 percent of these EU external imports (Table 18). 
It appears that Turkish firms operating in ‘buyer-driven’ chains are not merely assembly 
shops for EU multinationals taking advantage of cheap labor. While without the survey of firms 
in sectors or access to input-output tables it would be impossible to provide an unequivocal proof 
of this assertion, an examination of trade data tabulated in Table 18 suggests a two-way 
involvement going beyond simple outward processing.  
In fact, trade flows, encompassing two-way movements of both parts and final products 
within each chain point to the development of backward linkages. Import intensities in each 
chain, i.e., imports of parts/inputs relative to exports of final products and parts, have been 
declining. This indicates increase in local content, with parts domestically produced replacing 
imports. It appears that domestic suppliers of the T&C network were in business in 1996, as the 
import content of inputs in T&C exports was already very low then. Import intensity of T&C 
exports has remained at a low level of around 20 percent.
16 The import intensity of footwear and 
parts is relatively low. It fell from 13 percent in 1996 to 7 percent in 2001 and then increased to 
10 percent in 2004. In contrast, the import intensity of total furniture network exports fell 
between 1996 (50 percent) and 2003 (19 percent), but it rose to 34 percent in 2004. This ratio has 
been remarkably stable in the T&C chain. Its low level suggests a high value added domestically 
to its exports. While no firm conclusions can be drawn on the basis of such a crude measure, part 
of it can be attributable to more developed backward linkages in the Turkish T&C chains. 
Another feature shared by all networks except footwear, but only in 2003, is that they are 
net exporters. Exports from T&C network were consistently around four times higher than their 
imports in 1996-2003 and rose to more than six times higher in 2004. Except for furniture, other 
sectors increased their respective positive trade balances. The ratio of exports to imports for the 
furniture sector fell from 250 in 2003 to 161 percent in 2004. 
                                                           
16 Its import intensity of 23 percent is much lower than the same ratio for Bulgaria’s TC chain of 55 
percent. Although the higher level may be due to imported fabrics being used for producing more processed 
fabrics for exports, this probably does not explain the whole difference.   32
Table 18: Trade with the EU-25 in ‘buyer-driven’ chains in 1996, 200-2004 
   Index  2004
Product (SITC Rev. 2)  1996 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2000=100
Textile & Clothing (SITC 65+8998+84)     
Total exports of T&C ($ mill.)  6,144 6,807 7,098 8,036 10,090  11,542  170 
Share of Textiles in total T&C (%)  23.6 29.4 30.7 26.7 26.5  27.2    92 
Imports of textiles ($ mill.)  1,012 1,182 1,093 1,402 1,612  1806  153 
Share of textiles in T&C imports (%)  84.8 83.4 85.0 85.7 83.2  84.2  101 
Memo Items:        
Share of T&C in Turkey's all exports (%)  50.3 44.7 41.6 41.1 38.5  33.1    74 
Share of EU25 in Turkey's total T&C exports (%)  69.8 66.6 66.8 65.2 66.1  65.4    98 
Share of EU15 in Turkey's total T&C exports (%)  66.2 64.9 64.8 63.0 64.0  62.8    97 
Share in EU25 external imports of T&C (%)  11.1 11.7 12.4 13.6 14.6  14.8  127 
of which: Textiles (%) 8.8 11.7 13.2 13.5 15.0  15.7  134 
              Clothing (%) 12.1 11.8 12.2 13.8 14.6  14.5  124 
Total imports of textiles in % of total exports   22.3 21.0 18.3 23.4 22.9  13.2    91 
Total exports in % of total imports  404 414 475 380 379  639  111 
Footwear and Parts (SITC 85+6123)        
Total exports of footwear & parts ($ mill.)  39 36 42 52 83  106  298 
Share of parts in total footwear & parts exports  1.1 3.9 2.5 3.6 3.4  4.6  118 
Imports of footwear & parts ($ mill.)  61 63 44 53 64  74  118 
Share of parts in footwear & parts imports  22.4 17.7 18.7 19.5 19.2  14.9    84 
Memo Items:        
Share of footwear & parts in Turkey's all exports  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3  0.3  130 
Share of EU25 in Turkey's total footwear exports  26.1 31.3 33.0 39.5 45.2  51.7  165 
Share of EU15 in Turkey's total footwear exports   12.3 19.7 21.9 29.4 36.1  43.7  222 
Share in EU25 external imports of footwear & parts (%)  0.26 0.27 0.36 0.53 0.70  0.71 259 
of which: Parts (%)  0.03 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.25  0.31  216 
              Footwear, final goods (%)  0.30 0.29 0.40 0.58 0.76  0.75  258 
Total imports of parts as % of total exports  13.3 10.4 6.9 9.2 8.6  10.4    33 
Total exports in % of total imports  154 100 150 113 96  143  252 
Furniture and Parts Network        
Total exports of furniture & parts ($ mill.)  33 103 119 162 257  343  334 
Share of parts in total furniture network exports  35.5 21.1 19.8 21.0 22.8  22.1  105 
Imports of furniture & parts ($ mill.)  114 159 103 112 142  213  138 
Share of parts in total furniture network imports  29.1 29.7 33.2 45.0 46.9  54.1  177 
Memo Items:        
Share of furniture & parts in Turkey's all exports  0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0  1.0  146 
Share of EU25 in Turkey's total furniture exports   41.1 57.0 59.5 55.9 56.2  56.1    98 
Share of EU15 in Turkey's total furniture exports   38.6 53.3 57.8 53.6 53.3  52.7    99 
Share in EU25 external imports of furniture & parts (%)  2.10 2.60 3.17 3.86 4.25  4.4 162 
of which: Parts (%)  4.76 4.59 5.25 6.26 6.48  6.5  141 
              Furniture, final goods (%)  0.94 1.76 2.26 2.82 3.31  3.5  188 
Total imports of parts as % of total exports  50 33 20 20 19  34    73 
Total exports in % of total imports  59 89 162 223 250  161  242 
Total Buyer-Driven Chains        
Share of total above chains in Turkey's all exports (%)  50.9 45.6 42.6 42.2 39.8  34.4    75 
Share of EU25 in Turkey's total above chain exports (%)  68.8 66.0 66.3 64.7 65.6  64.9    98 
Share of EU15 in Turkey's total above chain exports (%)  65.0 64.2 64.2 62.5 63.3  62.3    97 
Share in EU25 external imports of total above chains (%)  9.4 9.6 10.2 11.2 11.9 
12.0 124 
of which: Parts  8.0 10.3 11.5 11.8 12.9  13.5  131 
              Final products  9.9 9.5 9.8 11.0 11.7  11.6  123 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Links to Pan-European consumers and suppliers of parts for further processing in Turkey 
have expanded since 1995 in most networks. Except for the T&C network, Pan-European markets  
absorbed over 1995-2003 a growing share of network exports and Pan-European producers   
accounted for an increasing share of imported inputs (Table 19). In 2004, these trends were 
reversed, as trade with the rest-of-world expanded slightly faster than with pan-European 
countries.   33
Table 19: Direction of trade in ‘buyer-driven’ network products and parts in 1995, 2000 and 2004 (in 
percent) 
  EU-25     Other  Pan-Euro ROW    
  1995  2000  2004 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 
T&C network             
Total  exports  70.1 66.6 65.4 2.6  2.8  3.7 27.3  30.6  30.9 
Imports of textiles  33.6  47.9  36.0  2.9  2.5  2.6  65.2  51.5  61.4 
Footwear network             
Total  exports  40.7 31.3 51.7 6.5  2.6  8.3 52.9  66.1  40.0 
Imports  of  parts  41.2 94.0 68.7  51.7 5.3 0.32  58.8 5.9 31.0 
Furniture network             
Total  exports  39.3 57.2 56.1 3.5  3.5  4.3 57.2  39.2  39.6 
Imports of parts  75.3  80.0  75.0  1.0  0.5  1.0  23.7  19.5  24.0 
Source: Computations based on Turkey reporting to UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
In all, developments in trade of ‘buyer-driven’ value chains seem to support the following 
observations: Respective industrial sectors in Turkey are not enclaves, but appear to be soundly 
immersed in the domestic economy. Each of them has been competitive in Pan-European markets 
registering gains in market shares consistently and without reversals over time, which, in turn, 
indicates continuous industrial modernization. These sectors have become parts of global value 
chains, organized mainly by EU firms, as trade with the EU and other Pan-European partners 
accounts for more than half of Turkey’s total trade turnover. Furthermore, although T&C towers 
over other sectors involved in ‘buyer-driven’ chains, furniture network has recently displayed 
strong growth outperforming in terms of exports other chains. 
B. ‘Producer-driven’ chains: automotive and information technology networks 
Production fragmentation in vertically integrated sectors has led to the emergence of 
‘producer-driven’ network trade. It differs in several important respects from traditional, ‘buyer-
driven’ global value chains. It includes two-way flows of parts and components across firms 
located in various countries for further processing and development occurring at several tiers with 
large multinational corporations playing a central role in coordinating the production process. 
‘Producer-driven’ networks are mainly present in capital- and skilled-labor-intensive 
industries such as automobiles, computers, semiconductors and heavy machinery. Automotive 
and information and communication technology (ICT) represent the most dynamic ‘producer-
driven’ networks. While outsourcing in clothing, footwear or furniture has rarely been 
accompanied by significant inflows of FDI, although there have been exceptions, the entry into 
supply chains of automotive and ICT networks is almost inconceivable without MNCs bringing 
capital, technology and marketing, albeit there are exceptions to this rule.
17 As MNCs drive trade 
in these two networks, it may be also referred to as “MNC-driven” network trade.
18  
Not surprisingly, linkages with EU firms have been driving ‘producer-driven’ network 
trade and they appear to be much stronger than in ‘buyer-driven’ trade with the EU accounting for 
a larger share of network trade. Other Pan-European countries’ firms and consumers remain 
marginal, although their significance increased over 2000-04. Automotive sector is more EU-
concentrated than the ICT industries. While EU markets take a larger share of total ICT network’s 
exports than automotive network’s exports, ICT firms are much more dependent on imports of 
final products in particular from ROW (Table 20).  
                                                           
17 A good example is the development of automotive industry in South Korea. 
18 The empirically observed positive correlation between multinational activity and intra-industry trade 
would also clearly point in this direction (Markusen 1998).   34
 
Table 20: Direction of trade in ‘producer-driven’ networks in 1995, 2000 and 2004 (in percent) 
 EU-25 Other  Pan-European  ROW   
  1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 
Automobile network                 
Network exports   57.8 63.8 72.8  3.2  2.4  4.0  39.1 33.7 23.2 
Exports of parts  63.6 65.2 65.1  2.0  1.0  1.8  34.5 33.8 33.1 
Network imports  75.5 80.0 81.3  0.9  0.5  0.6  23.6 19.6 18.1 
Imports of parts  79.6 70.6 79.7  1.2  0.8  0.6  19.2 28.6 19.7 
ICT network                 
Network exports   78.0 81.3 87.2  5.4  1.9 4.4  16.6  16.8  8.4 
Exports of parts  36.1 28.7 49.1 16.4  0.8  2.8  47.5 70.5 48.1 
Network imports  56.9 68.5 48.0  0.8  0.3  0.2  42.3 31.3 51.7 
Imports of parts  59.4 63.1 54.0  0.7  0.5  0.2  40.0 36.5 45.9 
Source: Computations based on Turkey reporting to UN COMTRADE Statistics. 
Turkish firms entered ‘producer-driven’ networks with a big bang in 2001 and 2002. In 
2001 the value of exports of automotive networks surged 64 percent. So did the value of ICT 
exports but a year later in 2002—it had the same increase. The surge in automotive exports raised 
their share in EU external imports 59 percent from 2.9 percent in 2000 to 4.6 percent in 2001. The 
expansion continued in 2002—2004, with the share growing to 5.5 percent in 2002 and 9 percent 
in 2004. The sudden explosion in ICT exports resulted in a 71 percent increase in their share in 
EU imports of these products from 0.7 percent in 2001 to 1.2 percent in 2002 (Table 21). The 
share of these two sectors in Turkey’s total EU-destined exports increased from 14 percent in 
2000 to 23 percent in 2003 and 27 percent in 2004. 
Although final products were behind the sudden surge of exports of both networks 
indicating specialization in assembly operations in the last stage of production process, there 
seem to be significant differences between two sectors in their modes of integration into global 
networks. ICT activities appear to consist mainly of assembly operations for exports. The share of 
parts in total ICT imports increased pointing to their growing use in assembly operations destined 
for exports. Another indication of specialization in the last stage of production process is the 
relatively low level of exports of parts and components. This suggests that there are few firms 
involved in supply chains of EU-based multinationals.  
In contrast, firms of the automotive network appear to display much wider specialization 
spanning across parts, components and assembly operations of motor vehicles. But the two 
sectors also vary greatly in terms of size and specialization profile. The automotive sector in 
terms of its exports is much larger than ICT. The former accounted for 20 percent of Turkish total 
exports in 2004 and 9 percent of EU external imports, whereas the latter contributed respectable 7 
percent but accounted only for 1.2 percent of EU imports of ICT products. The boost in exports 
of the automotive sector came mainly from exports of motor vehicles indicating the expansion in 
assembly operations. Yet, exports of parts and components doubled in terms of value rising from 
US$ 1,269 million (of which US$ 704 million went to the EU-25) in 2000 to US$ 2.5 billion with 
the EU taking US$ 1.4 billion in 2003 and US$ 2.7 billion with the EU purchasing US$ 1.8 
billion in 2004 . Exports of motor vehicles more than quadrupled over the same period increasing 
from US$ 1.2 billion (US$ 653 million to EU) to US$ 5.3 billion (EU-25 took US$ 2.9 billion) 
and US$ 7 billion (the EU US$ 5.4 billion) in respective years. In consequence, the share of parts 
in total automotive network exports fell from 52 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 2003 and 28 
percent in 2004. During the same period, the share of parts in ITC exports was at around 2 
percent. In brief, the involvement of producers of automotive parts in international supply 
networks exceeds significantly that of producers in the ITC sector.   35
Table 21: Exports to EU-25 of producer-driven networks in 1996, 2000-2004 (in million of US 
dollars and percent) 
                    
Index 
2004 
Producer-Driven Network  (SITC Rev. 2)  1996  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2000=100 
Automobile Network                      
Total exports of auto & parts ($ mill.)  577  1,357  2,225  2,783  4,355  7,019  517 
Share of parts in total auto network exports  54.6  52.1  42.9  38.8  32.3  24.9  48 
Imports of auto & parts ($ mill.)  2,582  5,391  2,255  2,953  6,011  10,529  195 
Share of parts in total auto network imports   46.7  37.5  63.6  62.6  47.3  45.0  120 
Share of parts imports in total auto network exports  208.8  149.1  64.5  66.4  65.3  67.5  45 
Memo Items:              
Share of auto & parts in Turkey's all exports (%)  4.7  8.9  13.0  14.2  16.6  20.1  226 
Share of EU25 in Turkey's total auto network exports  53.1  63.8  70.5  68.4  70.2  72.8  114 
Share in EU25 external imports of auto & parts  1.6  2.9  4.6  5.5  7.0  8.8  303 
of  which:  Parts  2.0 3.0 3.9 4.5 5.4  5.9  194 
              Auto, final goods (%)  1.2  2.8  5.4  6.5  8.3  11.2  402 
Information, Communication and Technology 
Network (ICT)                      
Total exports of ICT network ($ mill.)  228  819  811  1,333  1,692  2,556  312 
Share of parts in total ICT network exports (%)  6.4  2.2  3.9  1.8  2.7  2.2  97 
Imports of ICT network ($ mill.)  1,212  3,780  1,822  2,032  2,298  2,979  79 
Share of parts in total ICT network imports (%)  40.5  29.3  45.2  52.5  55.3  51.3  175 
Share of parts imports in total ICT network exports 
(%)  215.6 135.0 101.5  80.1  75.1  59.7  44 
Memo Items:              
Share of ICT network in Turkey's all exports  1.9  5.4  4.8  6.8  6.5  7.3  136 
Share of EU25 in Turkey's total ICT network exports  69.8  81.3  77.4  83.5  85.5  87.2  107 
Share in EU25 external imports of ICT network  0.3  0.6  0.7  1.1  1.1  1.2  206 
of  which:  Parts  (%)  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  160 
              ICT, final goods (%)  0.4  1.1  1.3  2.0  1.9  2.0  175 
Total Producer-Driven Networks                      
Share of total above networks in Turkey's all exports  6.6  14.3  17.8  21.1  23.1  27.4  192 
Share of EU25 in total above network exports  57.0  69.5  72.2  72.6  73.9  76.2  110 
Share in EU25 external  0.6  1.2  1.8  2.5  2.9  3.4  289 
of  which:  Parts  (%)  0.6 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.7  1.8  222 
              Final goods (%)  0.7  1.6  2.4  3.3  3.8  4.6  293 
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   
Other features setting apart automotive from ICT network are, first, that there is a large 
number of local suppliers of automotive parts and components and, second, the network appears 
to be moving rapidly towards the status of a net exporter. Large increase in their exports 
notwithstanding, the surge in exports of final products failed to trigger similar growth in imports 
of parts and components. While the value of total exports of the automotive network increased 
417 percent in 2000-04, imports of parts increased only 95 percent. Furthermore, the import 
intensity—as measured by the ratio of imports of parts to total automotive exports—of the 
automotive sectors has been falling rather steeply since 1996 and is lower than in the ICT 
network trade.
19  In trade with the EU the ratio fell from 3.04 in 1996 to 1.49 in 2000 and 0.68 in 
2004, while in total trade of this network from 1.35 in 1995 and 2000 to 0.62 in 2004 (Table 22). 
Overall, exports as a percentage of imports increased steeply from 32 percent in 2000 to 87 
percent in 2003. In other words, while in the 1990s imported parts were used among others to 
                                                           
19 Based on network trade intensities of EU-8 that successfully have entered into supply chains, the value of 
the share of imports of parts in network’s exports of parts and final products below 100 percent suggests 
significant involvement in division of production based on fragmentation (Kaminski and Ng, 2005).   36
assemble cars and trucks for protected domestic markets, the 2000s witnessed the emergence of 
firms producing parts both for exports and domestic consumption as well as cars destined for 
foreign markets.  
Table 22: Total automobile and ICT network trade and share of markets other than Pan-
European free trade area in 1995, 2000 and 2004(in million of US dollars and percent) 
             Automobile Network               ICT Network 
Producer-Driven  Network  Product  1995  2000  2004 1995 2000 2004 
Total network exports ($ million)  954  2,125  9,641  255  1,008  2,930 
Share of ROW (other than Pan Euro area)  39  34  23  17  17  8 
Exports of network final products ($ mill)  439  1,041  6,950  239  944  2,817 
Share of ROW (other than Pan Euro area)  44  34  19  14  13  7 
Total network imports ($ million)  2,033  6,742  12,952  1,677  5,522  6,200 
Share of ROW (other than Pan Euro area)  24  20  18  42  31  52 
Imports of network parts ($ million)  1,289  2,863  5,943  646  1,753  2,830 
Share of ROW (other than Pan Euro area)  19  29  20  40  36  46 
Total Exports as % of total Imports (%)  47  32  74  15  18  47 
Imports of parts as % of total exports (%)  135  135  62  253  174  97 
Source: Computations based on Turkey’s data reported to the UN COMTRADE Statistics.  
Last but not least, as it was signaled earlier, there is a difference in geographical patterns 
of external interaction. Producers in ICT networks rely more on imported inputs from other than 
pan-European suppliers and their exports are more concentrated on pan-European markets. 
Respective shares in imports of parts of the ROW in 2003 were 36 percent for the ICT network 
and 20 percent for the automotive network and in exports of final products 9 percent and 23 
percent respectively. 
C. Turkey’s producer-driven network trade in regional perspective 
Among EU candidates, Turkey is the only country whose firms appear to participate in 
division of labor driven by production fragmentation. The level of their participation appears to 
be higher than of two of EU-8, Latvia and Lithuania. The share of ‘producer-driven’ network 
products in exports of manufactures as well as its pace of growth was much stronger than in those 
two countries (Table 23). 
Table 23: Features of ‘producer-driven’ network trade of EU-8 and EU-candidates in 1995, 
2000 and 2004 (in million of US dollars and percent) 
 LS  Growth 
(%) 
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04 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004
Czech R.  1,919 6,655  15,355  23.1 23.1 14.8 28.5 34.9 42.9 42.6 55.2 68.3 45.5  31.5  14.4  17.9 35.0
Estonia  152 997  1,150  22.6  20.4 17.6 41.9 29.0 21.4 45.9 35.8 94.6 29.1  74.7  69.2  90.3 65.6
Hungary  2,191 12,851 22,026  22.8  17.2 26.1 56.9 59.6 85.2 66.4 80.0 51.7 17.5 13.2 29.4 59.0 62.4
Latvia  31 57  129  8.7  13.6 5.4 5.3 7.0 24.3 43.5 51.2 24.5 33.5  23.5  37.5  68.0 63.8
Lithuania  80 190 517  17.9  14.3 10.2 11.1 14.7 62.7 35.9 52.3 95.5 79.4  51.5  91.5  80.1 78.1
Poland  1,790 5,376  13,186  22.3 28.3 13.7 24.9 30.6 29.9 56.3 60.3 71.1 32.1  46.0  22.1  20.7 19.4
Slovakia  904 2,603 9,383  24.5 18.8 15.1 30.8 46.3 49.1 25.8 30.3 47.3 56.0  31.4  12.3  14.0 15.7
Slovenia  1,131 1,442 2,302  7.2  9.9 18.2 21.8 23.3 38.0 39.4 42.0 44.9 38.0  40.0 7.9  11.3 7.4
Bulgaria  91 93  167  3.8  6.9 4.8 3.8 3.2 52.1 67.2 69.8 45.7 51.2  55.7  16.2  43.3 55.1
Croatia  69 100 221  7.7  9.4 3.5 5.7 6.2 90.6 96.4 91.7 50.2 51.1  45.2  9.1  43.8 35.7
Romania  189 669  1,546  26.1  29.6 3.8 8.4 8.7 43.4 72.6 89.5 57.0 63.4  32.2  7.9  68.0 36.0
Turkey  1,079 3,205  11,209  25.1 16.8 8.1 15.9 25.3 68.1 54.0 30.2 14.5 8.5 4.7  23.8  33.8 23.0
Source: Computations based on UN COMTRADE Statistics.   37
Indeed, Turkey’s performance stands out. Together with Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Poland, Turkey has been identified in a recent World 
Bank study (WB 2006) as one of the seven “High Performers” among European and Central 
Asian countries in ‘producer-driven’ network trade. These countries share one major 
characteristic: the share of exports of ‘producer-driven’ networks in exports of manufactures, 
excluding chemicals, exceeded 20 percent in 2003. Turkey’s share of 22.5 percent puts it on a par 
with Slovenia and well above levels in other EU candidate countries. Except for Slovenia, the 
most developed economy among EU-8, exports of parts and exports of final products in High 
Performers grew at average rates exceeding 15 percent per year in 1995-2003. As a result, the 
share of Turkey in total ‘producer-driven’ networks’ exports of EU-8 and EU candidate countries 
increased from 9 percent in 2000 to 13 percent in 2003. This share in automotive exports is 
slightly higher amounting to 15 percent in 2003 up from 10 percent in 2000. 
D.  Concluding observations 
While ‘buyer-driven’ network exports still accounted for 62 percent of all network 
exports in 2004, their share rather dramatically declined form almost 90 percent in 1995-97 and 
75 percent in 2000. Moreover, the share of T&C products in ‘buyer-driven’ network exports 
slightly fell because of the increased industrial activity within the furniture network.  
Overall, there was a clear shift towards specialization in higher valued added ‘producer-
driven’ networks. The value of their aggregate networks more than quadrupled increasing 340 
percent while that of ‘buyer-driven’ exports increased 76 percent in 2004 over 2000. Exports of 
other parts and electro-engineering products more than doubled. The major driver of change, 
overall, has been automotive network, but strongly supported by the expansion in exports of ICT 
network final products. 
The comparison with other High Performers in ‘producer-driven’ network trade in the 
region indicates the room for further expansion. Despite the impressive export performance over 
2000-04, Turkey’s total ‘producer-driven’ network exports were equivalent in 2004 of 51 percent 
of Hungary’s exports, 73 percent of Czech, 85 percent of Poland’s and 119 percent of Slovak 
exports. 
6. Conclusions 
Turkey’s recent fast export expansion appears to be based on solid ground. It is 
geographically diversified; driven by skilled labor-intensive higher value added products with 
medium to high technology content; based on the entry of Turkish firms into supply chains of 
automotive and ICT networks; and supported by fast growth of unskilled labor and low tech-
intensive products. The shift towards higher value added exports has been taking place because 
differentials in fast growth rates have been in their favor. This has not been due to either slow 
down or collapse of unskilled labor-intensive exports but to a stronger push in other exports. 
The available evidence looks like an economic success story in the making, even if the 
story is far from over. Export expansion owes a lot to improved policy environment and domestic 
liberalization. It is rather telling that the recent expansion has coincided with the implementation 
of most provisions of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement, the completion of the removal 
of tariffs on trade in industrial products among Pan-European parties to the Pan-European 
Cumulation of Origin Agreement and improved macroeconomic stability after the 2001 crisis. 
The Pan European Cumulation of Origin Agreement together with elimination of tariffs in the 
Pan-European area have set the groundwork for the growth of intra-industry and network trade. 
The shift towards products requiring more capital, a better-trained labor force and more 
sophisticated technologies and participation in international ‘producer-driven’ networks has three 
important consequences.    38
•  First, industries intensive in skilled labor and capital tend to pay higher wages. It seems 
that the growth of exports in these sectors has boosted output growth and helped improve 
living standards. In contrast, exports of natural resource-based products that involve little 
processing do not have a similar effect on wages. 
•   Second, the shift away from products embodying natural resources and unskilled labor 
competitive in global markets augurs well for future sustainability of exports. High wages 
in higher technology sectors lead to higher wages in services (especially in non-tradables) 
and unskilled labor-intensive sectors, such as textiles and footwear. Given the growing 
competition from low-wage countries in Asia and elsewhere, these exports may not be 
sustainable over a longer term. On the other hand, capital and skilled labor intensive 
products are less sensitive to changes in labor cost. Sustainability of their exports hinges 
critically on availability of high quality human capital and firms’ absorptive capacity of 
new technologies. 
•  Third, network members, albeit there is no lifetime, guaranteed membership, are less 
vulnerable to local shifts in demand as their ‘centers’ operate in multiple foreign markets. 
   39
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